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This thesis examines the use of transportation as a
foreign policy instrument in Southern Africa. Because of its
dominant position in the regional transportation network,
the Republic of South Africa is the focus of this study.
Transportation has been used by the states of Southern
Africa as a means of gaining an advantage or leverage over
their neighbors to further their own vital interests,
economic and political. During the 1970' s the South African
Railways attempted to use common interests in the creation
and maintenance of effective transport organizations to
transcend regional political differences and improve inter-
state relations. This strategy came to be referred to as
transport diplomacy. After tracing the evolution of the
Southern African transport network and South African foreign
policy, this study examines several attempts to use trans-
port to achieve influence over neighboring states in various
ways. A framework that distinguishes between positive,
negative and neutral influence strategies is developed; and
an effort is made to identify the prerequisites for effec-
tive implementation of each type of strategy. Finally, an
argument is made that a distinct association of regional
transport organizations has come into being in Southern
Africa.
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I. REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF TRANSPORTATION IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA
A. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the colonial period, transportation networks,
especially the railroad system, have been used by political
leaders in Southern Africa to push regional development in a
direction that would benefit the particular personal or
corporate interests of a wide variety of individuals,
companies and nations. [Ref. 1] Even though the age of
empire building is past, transportation remains an integral
element of national development and a potential
vulnerability for many developing states. For these reasons,
transportation ties are particularly susceptible to
manipulation by governments seeking to influence conditions
and policies in neighboring states.
This thesis will examine the use of transportation as a
foreign policy instrument by Southern African states.
Particular attention will be paid to developments during the
period 1960-1985, especially the emergence of the strategy
of 'transport diplomacy' as practiced by the South African
Railway and Harbour Administration (SAR&H) during the 1970 's
and early 1980' s. Chapter One reviews the history of rail
transportation in Southern Africa in order to provide the
11
historical context in which politics and transportation have
worked side-by-side. To prepare the ground for the
assessment of transport's role in regional politics during
the 1970' s, Chapter Two provides an overview of South
African foreign policy which pays particular attention to
the importance of technical and economic cooperation.
Chapter Three outlines the development of 'transport
diplomacy' and the role SAR&H has played in the
implementation of South African foreign policy; and it
outlines the involvement of the South African transport
bureaucracy in foreign policy formulation. Finally Chapter
Four attempts to develop a theoretical framework which can
be used to analyze the use of transportation as an element
of foreign policy and to provide some suggestive comments on
the existence of an association of transport organizations
in Southern Africa.
For the purpose of this paper Southern Africa is
considered to include Zaire, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania,
Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho
and the Republic of South Africa (to include its so called
independent homelands). Due to the difficulty of gaining
access to Angola and an inability to speak or read
Portuguese this country's role has not been closely examined
except in the historical context and in so far as it has
aided Zambia's quest for outlets to the sea. Malawi has
12
been dealt with in a similar manner. 1 This is because of its
lack of direct involvement with South Africa's transport
system.
Except for Chapter One, this study concentrates on rail
transportation and all usage of the words "transport" or
"transportation" can be taken to mean rail transport. The
rationale for this is the fact that, measured in volume and
value, the railways have been the principal means of
interstate commerce in Southern Africa, and railways make up
the largest portion of each of the state transportation
organizations. At the same time it is important to
acknowledge that road transport as a means of carrying on
interstate trade, has been growing in importance in recent
years
.
B. THE EARLY YEARS, TO THE GOLD FIELDS
Until the mid- 1800 ? s geography confined most European
settlers in Southern Africa to the low lying and fertile
coastal regions. The principle obstacles to inland movement
were the escarpment, the deserts and the lack of navigable
rivers. As late as the 1860 's the ox cart and mule drawn
passenger coach service were still the principle means of
transport. This was a slow and expensive proposition that
1 In the opinion of the traffic planner for Malawi's
state trucking company this is a grave mistake, for Malawi
is on the verge of becoming the linchpin in the Southern
African regional transportation network.
13
was victim to the capriciousness of weather and disease. For
efficient transportation Africa had to wait for the
mechanization of transportation, railways, and sufficient
surplus capital to acquire them. [Ref. 2: p. 4]
The first efforts to raise the capital necessary for
railway construction in South Africa began in London in the
late 1840 ' s . Settlers in the colonies were strongly opposed
to railways because of concerns about the effects on the
livelihood of transport riders and horse breeders as well as
a fear of heavy taxes. Their opposition failed to stop the
efforts of the overseas financiers; and when the colonial
government agreed to guarantee the interest on capital plans
were set in motion. Guarantees provided by the British
government established an early precedent for state
involvement in the railway development in Southern Africa.
The first railway in Southern Africa was designed to
speed the movement of agricultural goods from the wine
growing district of Wellington to Cape Town. This 63 mile
line was completed in 1863. Minor additions were made in the
ensuing ten years. Although begun later than the Cape Colony
line, the Natal Railway Company completed the first rail
line in Southern Africa, a two mile line from the Point
(site of ship's dock) to the Durban market on 21 June 1860.
Within three years the line was in financial trouble. It was
saved by becoming a public institution. This line was
extended three and a half miles more to Umgeni by 1867. In
14
1875 the Natal government purchased this line for extension
inland to the sugar producing areas.
Meanwhile, the other ports of the Cape Colony, Port
Elizabeth and East London, demanded similar transport
facilities. The Cape government determined this to be too
difficult due to terrain and the railway's inability to
compete effectively with existing ox cart services in these
areas. The opening of the Kimberley diamond fields in 1870
changed this situation, for these ports were now the natural
ports for freight going to the diamond fields. The new
traffic justified a rail line to the 'fields' and the Cape
government, now the outright owner of the Cape-Wellington
line, seeking to satisfy all constituencies, authorized the
building of rail lines from all three ports.
As part of the debate about extending the rail lines,
the question of routing and rail gauges surfaced. In an
effort to reduce the initial costs of a rail line a 3 '6"
gauge was chosen. Since the 1870 's it has been the standard
gauge in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Progress toward Kimberley went forward slowly until the
rail lines had been carried over the escarpment, thereafter
it made rapid progress. By 1883 the eastern Cape lines had
reached the independent Orange Free State and were halted
pending resolution of a right of way through the Free State.
In the Orange Free State and the Transvaal the railways
were opposed on the grounds that railways were;
15
1. unnecessary,
2. detrimental to transport riding interests and spill
over industries that transport riding supports.
3. injurious to horse breeding,
4. likely to entail heavy land taxes,
5. likely to encroach upon property rights.
Anti-railway conferences were held in the Transvaal as late
as 1887. [Ref. 3: p. 7]
SOUTH AFRICAN RAILWAYS




Source: [Ref. 3: p. 86]
Figure 1.1 Gradient Profile of Durban Rail Line
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Discovery of gold in 1884 and the opening of the
Witwatersrand goldfields in 1885 caused a redirection
northward of all rail lines emanating from the coast.
Lourenco-Marques (now Maputo) was the closest port to the
Rand and Durban was second with the advantage of size and a
rail line already in place. The Cape ports were
progressively farther away and more expensive. The Orange
Free State sat astride the most direct routes, "Immediately
political considerations assumed a dominant role in railway
policy." [Ref. 4: p. 479] More specifically a desire for a
share of the coastal colonies' customs revenues prompted the
Free State, which was unable to raise sufficient revenue
independently due to its agriculturally based economy, to
form a Customs Union with the Cape and Natal in exchange for
rights of way.
The Transvaal had originally sought a united front with
the other Afrikaner republic, the Orange Free State.
However, President Brand of the Free State feared cutting
himself off from the established structure of the coast
colonies and a share of its port and rail revenues . The
South African Republic (the Transvaal) was anxious to have
an independent outlet to the sea and had hoped to annex the
area of St. Lucia on the north Natal coast. However, the
Convention of London, ending the 1880-81 Anglo-Boer war,
restricted the Transvaal's action and prevented it from
pursuing this idea further.
17
The era 1885-1895 and the competition for rail access to
the Transvaal provides a classic example of governments' use
of transportation to gain political advantage over its
neighbors. In this instance, political advantage equated to
the decisive economic need of having railroad freight rates
pay for the railroad construction costs.
Following Kruger's election in 1883, negotiations with
the Portuguese commenced for access to Lourenco-Marques.
This is because the Transvaal was still seeking freedom of
dependence on British controlled ports. Seeking greater
traffic revenue for their colony, the Portuguese gladly
signed a protocol providing for cooperation between the two
states in the building of a railway to the 'centre of trade'
in the Transvaal. [Ref. 5: p. 5] In 1886 the Transvaal
again sought financial aid from the Cape in the form of a
Customs Union only to be turned down. Their chance to return
the rebuff came only weeks later after the Cape realized the
true potential for trade to the Witwatersrand gold fields.
Later, in 1888 President Brand of the Free State hosted a
customs union conference. However, he found only the
Transvaal's intransigence to relying on British ports and
Natal 's reluctance to give up its low rates and favorable
position. The Free State and Cape did manage a customs union
among themselves and rail lines from the Cape proceeded,
reaching the Transvaal in 1892.
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For their portion of the rail line, the Portuguese
granted the railway concession to an American financed
company which rapidly went bankrupt and sold out to an
English owned company, owned by Cecil J. Rhodes. Claiming
breach of contract, the result of a dispute as to where the
border lay, the Portuguese seized the completed rail line
from the hapless Delagoa Bay and East African Railway Co.,
much to the relief of President Kruger who saw British
interests surrounding his republic.
The South African Republic granted a concession for
building a railroad from Pretoria to the Mozambique border
to Het Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorwegmaat chappij
(NZASM) . On October 24, 1894, after almost four years, a
grave toll in human life, and a change in contractors
necessary in order to repay old favors, the line was
completed. The NZASM ran into such serious financial
troubles that the Transvaal government was forced to buy its
shares and borrow money from the Cape Colony. This was done
under the Sivewright Agreement of 1891, which obligated the
NZASM to build a bridge across the Vaal River border and
construct a rail line in the Transvaal to connect the Port
Elizabeth line with Johannesburg and Pretoria. This line was
completed in 1892. It enjoyed a practical monopoly until the
line from Lourenco-Marques was completed two years later,
thus thwarting Kruger 's initial intentions.
19
Beginning in 1894 with the completion of all lines to
the Transvaal, competition for rail traffic became even more
acute, and success or failure had a very direct impact on
each colonies' financial viability. The Cape, having the
longest and most expensive routes, stood to lose the most
and sought an apportionment of traffic. The Transvaal
refused and maintained control by charging artificially high
or low rates on the segments of lines within her territory.
In order to direct as much traffic as possible to the
Lourenco-Marques line. The Cape lines responded by
trans-shipping their loads onto ox carts at the Vaal River
border and thus avoid the NZASM's high tariff lines.
Kruger's response was to close the Vaal River 'drifts'
(fords) on 1 October 1895. This effectively closed the
border to the Cape. At a conference in November 1895 Kruger
offered the Cape a guaranteed 33% of total goods traffic.
The Cape refused given that she was presently carrying
almost 80% of the Transvaal's traffic. (See Table I below.)
Shortly thereafter, Kruger, re-opened the drifts under
increasing pressure from the British government and domestic
unrest caused by hardships in Johannesburg, the result of a
lack of supplies and goods coming in over the NZASM line
from Lourenco-Marques [Ref. 5: pp. 84-85]. This competition
and the natural advantage of the Lourenco-Marques line
drastically altered the colonies' revenue projections. Along
with feeding inter-state hostility this had the effect of
20
preventing proper maintenance of existing lines and
construction of branch lines.
TABLE I
Percent of Traffic from the Transvaal by Port









































* The Orange Free State expropriated the rail lines in
1897 and thus the Cape Colony's share of revenues was
even less than reflected here.
**The Mozambique Convention, 1 April 1909, guaranteeing
Lourenco-Marques a minimum of 50% of Transvaal traffic,
stayed in effect until 1923 but was unable to be followed
during WWI due to wartime shipping restrictions.
***The result of tariff changes on the South
African Railways. In 1927 Portugal threatened to
terminate labor recruitment unless a new
convention was agreed upon.
****A new convention requiring a 47 1/2 %
minimum of traffic.
Lourenco Marques had built new oil storage tanks
causing this increase in
tonnage
.
Sources: [Ref. 6: pp. 712] [Ref. 5: pp. 98-99]
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C. CECIL J. RHODES AND THE CAPE TO CAIRO ROUTE
The history of transport in Southern Africa is
incomplete without due mention of Cecil J. Rhodes and his
legendary dream of a Cape to Cairo route. Rhodes was
motivated by a desire to extend the "civilizing" element of
the railroad, lay claim to and unite British provinces from
the Cape to Cairo, and increase his personal fortune from
mineral exploitation. Of greatest importance to the
furtherance of rail lines in Southern Africa was Rhodes'
political cunning and his ability to secure financing, all
in an effort to "extract maximum political advantage with
minimum financial outlay." [Ref. 7: p. 27] His efforts to
build the rail line from Kimberley to Bulawayo exemplify
Rhodes' approach.
The first initiative for a line through Bechuanaland
(Botswana) came in 1888 from Lord Gif ford's Exploring
Company. This rivaled Rhodes' plan for a line to the north
connecting the Cape with his recently won concession (1888)
in Mashonaland (the future Rhodesia). Consequently, Rhodes,
a powerful member of the Cape Parliament, supported the bill
for a rail line to the Transvaal and obstructed one for
connecting lines to Bechuanaland. Meanwhile, Rhodes
re-activated old 'friendships' with the Exploring Company
representatives in the Cape. This achieved the desired
effect of having them recommend to the London Board to join
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forces with Rhodes for a Bechuanaland rail line. This they
agreed to do, particularly after Rhodes' parliamentary
allies effectively denied the Exploring Company's plans for
a rail line on their own. Rhodes sought a royal charter
company for the administration of lands north of the
Transvaal (his recently won Mashonaland concession)
.
Towards this end he proposed forming the British South
Africa Company (BSAC or the Charter Company).
Rhodes drew considerable support for his British South
Africa Company based on:
1. a rivalry between the Boers, Germans, Portuguese and
English over the Zambezi region;
2. the growing clamor for better communications to
develop what was to become Rhodesia and;
3. demands for a railway to the north free of Boer or
Portuguese influence and interference.
Fortunately for Rhodes, at about this same time
(1889/1890) Kruger made it clear to the Orange Free State's
President Reitz that he did not want the Cape rail line to
go beyond Bloemfontein until his own Delagoa Bay line (to
Lourenco-Marques ) had progressed further. This made the
Bechuanaland rail line the only available option. This fact
and his pledge to the British government to spend one half
million Pounds on construction earned Rhodes the support of
the imperial government which strongly desired a transport
and communication through Bechuanaland. Cecil Rhodes' BSAC
was granted a charter for the administration of what were to
become the Rhodesias.
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In order that the BSAC partly relieve itself of the
financial pledge it had just made, Rhodes negotiated with
the Cape government for the option to buy the rail line from
Kimberley to Vryburg, at cost. With this assurance in hand,
the Charter Company bought out the Exploring Company's
remaining interest in a rail line through Bechuanaland by
granting them a 75% share of the profits from the sale of
the Chartered Company's 12,000 square mile land grant.
Finally in January 1890 agreement between Rhodes, the
British government and the Cape government was reached, the
terms suited Rhodes well:
He had pledged to spend half a million pounds on
building a railway through Bechuanaland, but he did not
want to tie up the bulk of the (British South Africa)
Company's initial capital on a secondary project such as
this. Money was required for the greater work, the
opening up of Mashonaland (Rhodesia) . The agreements of
January 1890 solved this problem. .. The British
government's two 6,000 square mile grants conveniently
provided the (BSA) Company with the means to fulfil its
obligations. It could use part of the first grant to pay
off the Cape for its services; the Exploring Company
could be bought out by transferring to it a share in the
land; and the capital required for building the
Vryburg-Mafeking line could be raised partly on the
strength of these grants ... 'Mr . Rhodes has, I think,
made a very clever political- financial arrangement',
commented Herbert at the Colonial Office. [Ref. 8:
pp. 19-20]
The Kimberley-Bulawayo railway project displayed a
number of Rhodes' and the British South Africa Company's
characteristics. Principally these were the ability to




, by allied capitalists, land grants and
dubious promises of future assets and lastly the colonial
government's willingness to accept liability to protect what
it perceived as its own vital interests. This episode also
exemplifies Rhodes' ability at "playing on the self
interests of others and thereby winning them to his side."
[Ref. 8: p. 33] He did this by emphasizing the Bechuanaland
railway as an agent of Cape expansion. In the long term the
railway was seen by the Colonial Office as an instrument for
British imperial expansion that would provide a link between
the Cape and the Rhodesias. It could help surround the
Afrikaner republics (and prevent German-Afrikaner
cooperation between South West Africa and the Transvaal)
[Ref. 9: p. 42] and serve as an instrument to bring about
the federation of Southern Africa. 2
Following settlement of Mashonaland (Southern Rhodesia)
by the Pioneer Column a less expensive and faster route than
ox cart from Vryburg was desired to the interior. To this
end Frank Johnson explored a route from Salisbury (now
Harare) to Beira on. the east coast via the Pungwe River.
Financed by Rhodes, Johnson organized a road building
expedition which arrived by ship off Beira in April 1891.
2 See P.R. Maylam, "The Making of the Kimberley-Bulawayo
Railway: A Study in the Operations of the British South
Africa Company", in Rhodesian History
,
vol 8 ( 1977 ) : 13- 33
.
,
for a most complete summation of the details of the politics
and financial arrangements of this episode.
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British occupation of Mashonaland had ended Portuguese
dreams of a trans-Africa colony and Portugal sought to
express its disappointment and unhappiness with the BSAC
treatment of Portuguese nationals in Mashonaland by refusing
to allow a road right of way through Mozambique.
Consequently, the true intent of Johnson's expedition was to
provoke an incident with the Portuguese authorities whereby
the British government would be forced to act firmly against
the Portuguese in defense of the freedom of international
waterways and trade.
The Portuguese provided the necessary incident by firing
a blank shot when the expedition's ships tried to advance up
the Pungwe River estuary. The "Beira incident" provided the
necessary catalyst to get the British government to insist,
as part of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of June 1891, on
recognition of the Pungwe River as an international waterway
and provide for the right to build a railway to connect
Mashonaland with the east coast. [Ref. 10: pp. 1-3] With
these guarantees in hand it was only a matter of time, money
and thousands of lives lost to fever before the railroad was
built to Umtali, in Mashonaland. It was completed on 4
February 1898.
Native rebellions and a rinderpest plague that destroyed
the draft animals hastened the need for better
communications and a line to Bulawayo was completed in 1897.
When the line to Salisbury had been completed five years
26
later it already had an outlet to the sea via the port of
Beira in Portuguese East Africa.
Still a privately owned line, the Charter Company's
railroads needed a high volume of traffic to be profitable
and thus followed the mineral finds north to Wankie,
Southern Rhodesia (coal) and then reaching Broken Hill,
Northern Rhodesia (lead and zinc) in 1906. But the expected
traffic volume did not materialize and the BSAC found itself
again in dire financial straits. Fortunately for all
concerned, proof of extensive copper holdings in Katanga,
needing only only a transport outlet to be feasible, was
made public in 1906/1908.
D. CONSOLIDATION OF COLONIES AND TRANSPORTATION
During the Anglo-Boer War, 1898-1902, both sides sought
control of the railroads. By maintaining the security of the
Cape lines and ports, the British were able to use the
railways to greater advantage. The Anglo-Boer war also had
the effect of beginning to unite the railways of South
Africa under one administration, though not with one
purpose
.
Railway consolidation was effected under the supervision
of an English railwayman, LTCOL E.P.C. Girouard. His
principle effort was to combine the railways of the Orange
Free State and the Transvaal, titling the resultant
27
organization, Imperial Military Railways. Following the
cessation of hostilities in June 1902, this became the
Central South African Railways and Girouard remained as
commissioner.
The Peace of Vereeniging ended the Anglo-Boer War and
allowed the railroad rivalry to begin anew. Heavy traffic,
the result of wartime movements had boosted railway revenues
and colonies' finances. This had enabled expansion via
branch lines into agricultural areas. The Transvaal built
lines with the idea of increasing communication into
underdeveloped areas. [Ref. 4]
The colonial government's concern for an undisrupted
mine labor supply enabled Portuguese East Africa
(Mozambique) to win a traffic guarantee of a minimum of 50%
of Transvaal traffic in exchange for South African mine
labor recruiting in Mozambique. The remainder of the
traffic was apportioned between the British colonies in a
1904 agreement.
With increasing realization of the importance of
railways to development in all states, the need for
agreement on technical matters and the increasing
difficulty of operating several systems individually,
the need for a unified system came to be appreciated,
constituting a major factor hastening Union in 1910.
[Ref. 4: p. 483]
The South Africa Act creating the Union of South Africa
also created the South African Railways and Harbour
Administration and established an organization for its
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management. The real interests of South Africa (as in all
countries of Southern Africa) lay in the most efficient and
least expensive development of transport facilities. In an
effort to achieve this, article 127 of the South Africa Act
established the basis of the financial policy of the
railways
;
The railways, ports and harbours of the Union shall be
administered on business principles; due regard being
had to agricultural and industrial development within
the Union and promotion, by means of cheap transport, of
the settlement of an agricultural and industrial
population in the inland portions of all provinces of
the Union.... [Ref. 11: pp. 315-316]
A lot of this reorganization was done with the idea of
freeing the railways from political influence which may
effect both matters of domestic and foreign policy. An
independent body of men with commercial experience was
established to oversee management of the SAR&H. As will be
shown in Chapters 2 and 3, however, Southern Africa's
railway networks have been unable to avoid political
manipulation.
Following Union, and with the exception of World War I's
expansion into South West Africa, SAR's main priorities were
economically and domestically focused. But expansion was
occurring for other reasons elsewhere in the region. For
example, in German South West Africa (SWA) (presently
Namibia) rail lines were built mainly by the military for
primarily strategic reasons.
29
A desire to link the interior capital, Windhoek, with
the coast
,
Walvis Bay, was brought to fruition in June 1902
when a German Army Railway Brigade finished the line after
nearly five years of work. During this period a private
concern began a rail line to the mining area of Tsumeb in
the north of SWA. This being a better line the state line
was connected to it, and the old line allowed to fall into
disuse and eventually abandoned.
A combined desire to develop the diamond mining of the
south coast and bring the interior city of Keetmanshoop into
closer communication and control hastened the building of a
rail line by colonial troops from Luderitz to Keetmanshoop
during the years 1908 to 1909. Complete communication within
the colony was begun a year later when a line was built
between Keetmanshoop and Windhoek.
Though designed to help consolidate Germany's hold on
her colony, this rail system aided the British and South
African forces in their capture of the colony in 1915. After
the rapid construction of a rail line from South Africa as
part of the military subduing of the German colony, South
West Africa was linked to and became part of the South
Africa Railways.
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E. POLITICAL INTERESTS AND RAILWAY EXPANSION IN CENTRAL
AFRICA
In the first decade of the twentieth century the Katanga
region was at the political and economic center of national
interests in Africa as well as the geographic center. All
of the interested European powers (Britain, Belgium,
Portugal and Germany) sought to gain the greatest profit
from exploitation of the Katangan mines. Though each
government generally supported its citizens' efforts at
development, support was not forthcoming when it was seen to
conflict with national interests. In the final analysis, in
the development of Katanga and its transport lines,
political considerations superseded economic interests.
[Ref. 12: p. 132]
An Englishman, Robert Williams, won the concession to
develop the Congo's Katangan minerals and formed the
Tanganyika Company (TANKS) for this end. Identifying rail
transport to the Angolan coast as the least expensive means
of transport he sought and received a concession from the
Portuguese for a rail line from Lobito to the Angolan
eastern frontier. King Leopold, and later the Belgian
government, wanted to keep as much of the wealth as possible
within the Congo and sought a rail and/or river route to its
port at Matadi. It was also believed that this could help
develop the Congo's interior. Once the wealth of Katanga was
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proven (by 1906) the BSAC became interested in transporting
minerals via Rhodesia Railways to Beira for a share in the
Katangan mines. Two years later, when it was in a
substantially weaker financial position, the Charter Co.
agreed to build a line to the Congo border for simple
remuneration.
As evidenced by the "secret" 1898 British-German treaty,
Germany had its eyes fixed on acquiring parts of Angola and
Mozambique in the event that Portugal sought to abandon
these colonies. Consequently, Germany saw the Benguela
railroad as a potentially valuable future asset. 3 Even
without acquiring territory in Angola a large share in the
railroad would enable Germany to bring pressure on Portugal
for concessions in southern Angola and advance its plans to
create a transcontinental rail line.
Once work finally began, Williams was plagued by
financial difficulties. Progress was further hampered by
World War I and multiple changes of government in both
Belgium and Portugal. The Portuguese, who had the most to
gain from the railroad, were not in a strong diplomatic or
financial position and were thus of little real assistance.
Once Belgium had its own routes well established
3 John Day in "Railways of Southern Africa" says that in
1912 Germany was actively seeking financing to buy the
railroad and that during World War I dumps of railroad
building material were found along a proposed rail line from
Tsumeb, SWA to Angola. [Ref. 13: pp. 115-120]
32
(mid-1920' s) and realized that there would be sufficient
traffic for all prospective lines, offered to guarantee to
finance the Katanga section of line to Elizabethville
.
[Ref. 12: p. 93]
Ultimately, Williams sought British financial
guarantees. The BSAC (the Rhodesias) were opposed to any
British guarantees provided for a potential competitor and
placed all of their diplomatic and financial strength behind
their efforts. Williams found these to be far stronger than
his comparatively meagre resources and fallacious claims of
British national interests [Ref. 12: p. 93]. The Union of
South Africa under General Smuts also opposed the guarantee
because the rail line would enable Katangan merchants to
bypass Johannesburg when importing goods. Smuts also had
desires on making Southern Rhodesia part of the Union and
joining the two railway networks and so he wanted to
maintain the high revenue traffic on the Rhodesia Railways.
Only after Smuts' June 1924 defeat at the polls was this
obstacle removed. The new Prime Minister, Hertzog, was less
imperialistically inclined. Though the British Colonial
Office's position (ie. that of Southern Rhodesia and
Rhodesia Railways) remained essentially unchanged, the
government's Board of Trade was starting to realize that the
Benguela line would be finished regardless of British
support and desired that the orders for equipment and
materials be handled by British suppliers. "It was only when
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opposition to the railway from the Empire (principally Union
of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) was withdrawn that
the desire to alleviate unemployment in Britain was allowed
to come to the fore," enabling Williams to secure indirect
financing from the British government." [Ref. 12: p. 133]
Since 1912 most of Katangan copper has traveled south to
Beira. Even when the alternative and less expensive routes
opened, the Rhodesia Railways commanded one third of the
traffic as a means of ensuring the supply of coal and coke
from Wankie. Not until the railway crises and border
closures of the 1960's and 1970 's were the Benguela and
Congo routes utilized to carry their full capacities. Prior
to Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)
these arrangements were set forth in international
agreements that restricted the freight on Lobito line to 20%
of the total exported.
The Portuguese also played the game of rail traffic
manipulation. Following their take-over of Rhodesia
Railways in Mozambique, they initiated the Beira Convention
which guaranteed that the Rhodesias would use the Port of
Beira to full capacity and not cause a diversion of traffic
by discriminatory charges.
"See Leroy Vail, "Railway Development and Colonial
Underdevelopment: the Nyasaland Case" in The Roots of Rural
Poverty in Central and Southern Africa, pp. 365-391,
particularly page 383 for the October 1928 British
government memorandum eliciting this exact rationale.
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In 1963 Zambia and Southern Rhodesia agreed that if
either country were to divert traffic from the Rhodesia
Railways system (which they jointly owned since the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953) it must pay
compensation to the other [Ref. 14: p. 49]. Unable to
afford this additional cost, Zambia's options were
effectively stymied, to include the option of road transport
which was also restricted from competing with the railroads.
Southern Rhodesia took full advantage of its position
vis-a-vis Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) receiving most of its
profitable traffic from Zambia and using it to move its own
produce at a loss. (See Table IV)
F. RAILWAYS AS A ROUTE TO IMPOVERISHMENT
One of the last main line railroads to be built in
Southern Africa, the Trans-Zambesia Railway, provides one of
the sadest examples of misguided political interests. These
interests combined with greed to create a heritage of
impoverishment for the Protectorate of Nyasaland (present
day Malawi)
.
At the turn of the century the Shire Highlands of
Nyasaland were viewed by the British government as ideally
suited for plantation agriculture. The settlers' demand for
African labor to work their plantations competed with the
existing demand for labor to provide human porterage. This
created a novel argument to build a railroad in order to
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free human porters to work the income producing plantations.
Following the Anglo-Boer War (1902) the British Foreign
Office permitted construction of a rail line to begin. By
World War I a line had been built from Blantyre in the
highlands to the Zambezi River.
Following WWI , which effectively removed Germany from
Eastern Africa, Britain saw an opportunity to expand her
interests in the area by buying controlling interests in the
Portuguese chartered companies administering the northern
sections of Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). Private
British companies were chosen to act as agents for the
government in order not to provoke Portuguese suspicions.
[Ref. 15: p. 369]
One aim of these chartered companies was the development
of their territories, and this meant railroads into the
interior. Due to a lack of funds the companies sought
British guarantees of their debentures. Despite gloomy
economic outlooks for the proposed Beira-Zambezi line and
the fact that Portugal was already building a competitive
line in the vicinity, this idea was seized by the British
Colonial Secretary as the means by which to "bolster
Britain's economic position in the south... especially as
she thought there was an imminent American commercial
invasion of the area in the offing." [Ref. 15: p. 370] The
burden of this financial guarantee fell to the Protectorate
of Nyasaland owing to a misunderstanding between the
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Colonial Office and the Treasury as to which office would be
responsible for the future debt. [Ref. 15: pp. 371-372].
In an effort to reduce this financial obligation,
Nyasaland fell into a never ending circle of freight rate
policies and improvements designed to increase the railway's
efficiency. However, these additional investments only
added to the debt burden of the colony which was required to
guarantee the investments. The ultimate project in this
category was the Zambezi River bridge. It was believed that
this bridge would improve railway efficiency and would pay
for itself by providing the needed impetus to develop the
Moatize coal fields which could be used for fuel and rate
paying traffic. By the mid- 1920 's the impoverishment of
Nyasaland was getting to be all too apparent to the settlers
and even the Colonial Office. But domestic British interests
in the form of unemployment and a failing steel industry
carried the day in the push for building the Zambezi bridge.
Once again Nyasaland was provided a loan, adding to her
already unmanageable debt, with which to fund the bridge
project she did not want.
This episode serves as an example of how British
strategic and commercial interests dominated/ commandeered
the policies of the Protectorate of Nyasaland.
To further British interests in the area imperial
decisions were taken to protect the British proxy there,
the Mozambique Co. .This protection included support for
the Trans-Zambesia Railway project ... this was calculated
to protect interests from American commercial
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threats... In the late 1920's a second major project was
approved ... the Zambezi bridge... in order to provide
steel orders .... The only possible money maker for the
bridge and railway system (Moatize coal)... was prevented
from being developed lest it compete with Welsh coal.
[Ref. 16: p. 112]
G. EXPANSION AND MODERNIZATION
The pre-Anglo-Boer war years demonstrated the
disadvantages of rate wars to all of the region's rail
lines. In the seven years preceding the formation of the
Union of South Africa in 1910 numerous conferences were held
to develop an equitable sysytem to regulate freight rates
and traffic. These conferences resulted in a growing
consensus for a union of the colonies, expressed in 1907 by
the High Commissioner of South Africa, Lord Selbourne:
conflict of railway interest, would vanish like a foul
mist before the sun of the South African Federation,
would it any longer be in the interests of the
Transvaal to lead exclusively to Delagoa Bay
(Lourenco-Marques ) . [Ref. 3: p. 26]
It was further argued in 1908 by the Closer Union
Organization in their booklet, "The Government of South
Africa", that only the central government shall have the
power to manage a private corporation (ie. transportation)
that otherwise would be more powerful than the state itself.
It therefore, should be the government's responsibility to
build and administer transportation [Ref. 3: p. 26].
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The South Africa Act of 1909, creating the Union of
South Africa, sought to end railway competition, declaring
that: "...all Ports, Harbours and Railways belonging to the
several colonies at the establishment of the Union shall
from the date thereof vest in the
Governor-General-in-Council. " [Ref. 3: p. 13] Thus was
formed the South Africa Railways and Harbour Administration
(SAR&H). 5 However, this new organization's responsibility
became increasingly clouded and in 1916 a supplementary act
was passed which more clearly delineated the chain of
responsibility of the SAR&H to the Minister of Transport who
was to be advised by the Railways and Harbour Board.
In the pre-Union era inter-colonial rivalry for mineral
related traffic was the criteria for railway construction.
Following Union other domestic interests began to dominate,
primary among them being agricultural interests. During the
period 1910-1935, eighty-seven separate acts were passed by
Parliament rendering permanent assistance to the farmers.
"These acts and the scores of similar acts which followed
them made agriculture the favorite and special charge of the
state" [Ref. 17: p. 253] It is important to note that the
mines provided the bulk of the money for the agricultural
schemes, this included paying exorbitant freight rates which
5 In 1981 the SAR&H changed its name to South African
Transport Services (SATS) to more accurately reflect its
much broader transport responsibilities.
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made it possible to reduce the railway rates for
agricultural products and machinery, some of which was
carried at a loss or provided free of charge as in the case
of moving livestock during times of drought. The growing
political importance of the agricultural sector required the
government to meet the demand for branch lines to the maize
producing areas, uneconomical though they were. The advent
of the automobile and truck allowed the railways to
shut-down uneconomical rail lines and simultaneously
increase motor transport services (begun in 1924) to rural
areas, substantially improving market access and
production. 6
In keeping with the theme of this thesis, transport in
international relations, the history of the SAR during the
years from Union to the 1960's/70's will not be detailed
here. However, it is worthwhile to point out that:
1. During this period, interest in transportation was
domestically focused and centered principally on the
issue of how freight rates were to be determined. A
hotly and repeatedly debated issue was the
interpretation of the portion of the South Africa Act




s See Trampitsch, [Ref. 18] especially page 19 for
comment and analysis of the negative consequences of new
transport routes in undeveloped areas
.
7 See Frankel, Herbert S. and Verburgh for examples of
this debate. These two books and their authors led the
debates and analysis of the politics and economics involved.
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TABLE II
South African Railways Route Mileage
Year Mileage Year Mileage
1873 57 1915 9,011
1875 144 1920 9,565
1877 404 1925 11,923
1879 849 1931 13,098
1882 1070 1941 13,231
1884 1572 1951 13,501
1886 1821 1956 13,608
1895 2651 1961 13,635
1905 5517 1966 13,728
1910 6991 1984 14,840
Sources : [Ref
.
19] and [Ref. 20]
2. By 1925 most mainline railways were in place. Mileage
added after that time was principally designed to
expand the capacity of congested lines. (See Table
II for the progression of route mileage on SAR.
)
3. The efficiency of SAR&H improved by quantum leaps
because of countless technological improvements and
demands placed upon it during the the two World Wars.
The most important technological advances included
using heavier track, new rail designs, longer welded
rails , concrete sleepers (ties), tunnelling, regrading
and new bridges . Cargo handling was improved and
electrification was begun, allowing for heavier
trains, more efficiently running engines and reducing
the need to haul coal around for use on smaller
branch lines located away from coal bunkers.
[Ref. 13: pp. 62-63]
4. Motor transport services of SAR&H assumed an
increasingly important role in moving products to the
rail lines, enabling the government to resist demands
to build unprofitable rail lines.
5. The railway was involved in some interests outside
the borders of South Africa in an effort to attract
transit traffic. For example, it once led a move to
impose extremely unfavourable tariffs on Benguela
traffic and was disappointed at Rhodesia's rejection
of a rail line through Beit Bridge. [Ref. 7: p. 19]
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6. Engineering and transport conferences served to
create a limited degree of cooperation and
interchange between national railway organizations in
Southern Africa. The first such conference was held
in Johannesburg in 1936 and then again in 1950.
During the 1950 's and early 1960 's there were six
more conferences of the General Managers
.
The other national rail networks in the region were also
moving through a phase of expansion by building branch lines
and incorporating the same technological changes mentioned
above. World War II dealt a severe blow to most lines,
particularly in the high demands for service and few
opportunities or equipment for repairs and maintenance. In
the case of Rhodesia Railways the need was so great and the
lack of capital so severe that the government of Southern
Rhodesia purchased the line in 1949. In the same year the
Portuguese government purchased the Beira-Umtali line making
all major rail lines in the region state owned. Problems in
freight handling resulted in the first major post-war
traffic restrictions. This occurred when congestion at the
port of Beira became so severe that the Mozambican
government was forced to restrict Rhodesian traffic
requiring Rhodesia to use South African ports.
The creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
in September 1953, broadened the ownership of Rhodesia
Railways. More significantly the new broader interests of
all three states in the Federation resulted in the building
of a rail line from Bulawayo to Lourenco-Marques
,
giving the
Federation access to three ports; Port Elizabeth, Beira and
42
Lourenco-Marques . A route to Beit Bridge, South Africa was
also considered but rejected because too much of the
generated revenue would accrue to South Africa. [Ref. 21:
p. 1553]
In the field of transport, the period of independence in
Southern Africa was characterized by nationalization of
transportation as a revenue generating and politically
influential asset. The break up of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland resulted in Southern Rhodesia
receiving the lion's share of the railway assets and
facilities. Zambia kept the tariff collection point.
The 1970 's were a time of even more modernization and
expansion by SAR&H in an effort to meet the growing demand
of industry for more efficient transportation. Projects
included computerized traffic control and the building of
Richard's Bay (a bulk handling terminal to provide an
alternative to Maputo) and the Sishen-Saldanha Iron Ore
Project. The SAR&H also aided a South African consortium in
its effort to build the Mozambican port of Nacala and rail
line to Malawi. It also helped Rhodesia build the Beit
Bridge link in an ironic reversal of 15 to 70 years earlier
when the line was not built in an effort to reduce contact
with South Africa.
Outside South Africa the most significant event in the
transportation network was the building of the TANZAM
railway from Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia to Dar Es Salaam,
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Tanzania. This opened in 1975 and was the first major rail
line in the region since the Benguela line opened in 1931.
More importantly, it provided Zambia with a rail outlet not
under the control of a white minority ruled country. 8
During this period, economic growth and transport
expansion in South Africa interacted with independence
struggles and civil wars in the rest of the region to enable
the Republic to increase even further its dominant regional
position in the field of transportation. This fact is
demonstrated in Table III.
TABLE III
Transport Infrastructure in Southern Africa,
South Africa Compared to the Rest
Point of Comparison 1974 1981
Rail route-kms. per capita 3.9:1 4.2:1
Rail route-kms. per sq km 3.7:1 4.0:1
Rail wagons per capita 13.3:1 13.4:1
Locomotives per capita 10.0:1 10.9:1
Ton-kilometer per capita 10.0:1 12.9:1
Road kms . per capita 3.8:1 2.8:1
Tarred road kms per capita 5.1:1 8.0:1
Roads kms. per sq km 2.7:1 2.7:1
Source: [Ref. 22: pp. 15-19]
8 For a very complete story of the history, construction
and political ramifications of the TANZAM see Martin Bailey,
Freedom Railway
,
London: Rex Collings, 1976.
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Often times more significant than mileage and ton-miles is
the access to the sea, ie. ports. In this regard South
Africa has the upper hand in that it has seven major
ports, to include the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa (Durban)
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II. HISTORY AND FORMULATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY
A. HIGHLIGHTS IN THE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN
POLICY
This chapter outlines some of the highlights and trends
of recent South African foreign policy, with special
emphasis on South Africa's use of technical and economic as
an instrument of its policy towards the Southern African
region. The transportation infrastructure and organization
has played an important role in regional foreign relations
and details of its role will be covered in section B.
Section C will address the role transportation plays in the
formulation of foreign policy in South Africa. Prior to
1948 South Africa's foreign relations were closely tied to
the policies of the United Kingdom, both substantively and
procedurally. During this period, trade, finance and
industrial representatives were frequently called on to act
as diplomatic representatives abroad.
Following the 1926 Balfour Declaration, which confirmed
the independent status of the Union, South Africa created a
Department of External Affairs in 1927. The portfolio for
this ministry was maintained in the hands of the Prime
Minister (first Hertzog and then Smuts and Malan) . Dominance
by such a forceful personality as General Smuts resulted in
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a very personal imprint on foreign policy matters and
occasional bypassing of the Department of External Affairs
and even overseas diplomats in major policy decisions.
[Ref. 24: p. 9]
Smuts foresaw the post-World War II British Commonwealth
as a continuation of the Commonwealth of pre-war days and
envisaged this organization as a means of extending South
African influence in Africa. Smuts suggested that a
commission, composed of colonial powers and others with
economic and military interests in Africa be established to
devise a common policy for Africa. He argued that South
Africa ought to be included because of its status as an
independent, developed state with a large white population
and which had the mandated responsibility for South West
Africa. Nothing came of this suggestion, however.
Smuts wanted Africa, and particularly Southern Africa,
to be South Africa's sphere of influence, and since the
1920 's South Africa has had ambitions to knit together "the
parts of Southern Africa that belong to each other, parts
that most necessarily work together for a stable future on
the continent of Africa." [Ref. 25: p. 20] South Africa's
regional foreign policy heritage is thus one of closer
regional co-operation, though during World War II and the
early postwar years it was assumed that South Africa would
work for closer regional co-operation with members of the
colonial empires and not as fellow independent states.
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Prime Minister Malan, the first National Party Prime
Minister (PM) , 1948-1954, established a roving ambassador to
try and counter the world's growing estrangement with South
Africa. However, the Prime Minister maintained the foreign
affairs portfolio for "himself. While international
condemnation of South Africa grew louder, especially from
newly independent nations, foreign economic relations were
largely unaffected. More importantly, continuing strong
economic relations with the West meant that foreign powers
had a stake in maintaining a stable South Africa. Trade
within Africa continued to grow. However, creation of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 altered the
trade pattern between South Africa and the Rhodesias, the
result of the Federation's protective tariffs.
By the mid- 1950 's South Africa had to face the reality
of newly independent African states. Malan saw Africa as
South Africa's primary diplomatic front but thought in terms
of European powers, of which he counted the Union.
Prime Minister Strydom, 1954-1958, appointed Eric Louw
as Minister of External Affairs relieving himself of the
portfolio. This action placed foreign affairs in the hands
of a man who was not only a close political ally but the
foremost expert in the cabinet [Ref. 24: p. 21]. Louw
realized that South Africa's future did not lay in
identification with the colonial powers and urged that South
Africa "accept its future role in Africa as a vocation and
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must in all respects play its full part as an African
power". He foresaw South Africa as a link between the West
and the states of Sub-Sahara Africa. He hoped these African
states would realize that apartheid was not a threat to them
and that all states could combine to counter external
interference. [Ref. 25: p. 106]
In the absence of diplomatic ties with most African
countries, both Prime Ministers Strydom and Verwoerd,
1958-1966, emphasized the promotion of technical cooperation
between South Africa and African territories, and on South
Africa's ability to provide assistance in such fields as
agriculture, medicine and communications. This was
publicized by Louw in March 1957 when he spoke at the
University of Pretoria. He argued that South Africa, by
making its scientific and technical assistance available to
Black states, would be able to preserve its white identity
and establish mutual trust and understanding [Ref. 25: p.
106] . Pretoria saw technical cooperation and the provision
of aid as an important channel of communication and as a
possible forerunner to the eventual establishment of formal
ties [Ref. 24: p. 14]. Until the mid-1960' s South Africa had
contact with the countries and territories of Africa via
organizations such as the Commission for Technical
Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA) and its
auxiliary Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara
(CSA) and the Inter-African Bureau for Soil Conservation
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(BIS). These were disbanded or absorbed by the OAU in the
mid-1960's.
This form of inter-action initially transcended
independent Black Africa's break of relations with South
Africa and would resurface again 20 years later as the only
source of contact between otherwise hostile states.
Growing international isolation, highlighted by the
Commonwealth's efforts to change the internal politics of
South Africa, and a desire to finally free itself from the
United Kingdom prompted Prime Minister Verwoerd to leave
(some would say be thrown out of) the British Commonwealth
of nations. The ultimate break with the Commonwealth on 31
May 1961 also changed the Union of South Africa to a
Republic and the Department of External Affairs became the
Department of Foreign Affairs. This victory of Afrikaner
independence was a symbol of growing withdrawal from old
ties. Internally the country was faced with its most serious
threat to stability in the form of the Sharpeville riots.
Repressive security measures restored order and near
draconian economic measures eventually restored domestic and
international confidence in the economy. About this time the
government also introduced the idea of separate development
or 'grand apartheid' as its answer to quell criticism of the
lack of political representation of Blacks in South Africa.
Louw served as Foreign Minister until 1966. During the
Verwoerd years ( 1958- September 1966), however, the Prime
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Minister dominated foreign policy formulation. This he was
able to do due to his high personal standing, leadership and
power of persuasion [Ref. 24: pp. 22-23]. Such strong and
powerful leadership had the disadvantage of creating an
attitude of "leave it to Verwoerd". This was reinforced by a
sense of God-chosen leadership among the Nationalist
Afrikaners [Ref. 25: p. 131].
During the early 1960 's South Africa's foreign policy
became largely a response to external attacks. But after the
troubles of 1960-61 the economy began to pick-up again and
by 1964 Prime Minister Verwoerd was able to tell the House
of Assembly that once the maelstrom and chaos of the early
years of independence were over, good relations would be
established with other African states and, as originally
predicted, the foundations of good relations would be built
on South Africa's economic and technological strength
[Ref. 25: p. 167]. Verwoerd established two guiding
principles of South African foreign policy:
1. The objective of maintaining the white nation of
South Africa.
2. Friendly relations would be sought only within the
limits of South Africa's right to its own domestic
policies to include the establishment of independent
homelands, "a policy which does precisely what those
countries of Africa which attack us want for
themselves." [Ref. 26]
This scheme and these principles for regional relations
formed the basis of South Africa's regional policy in
subsequent years . Verwoerd had a strong belief in the
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primacy of economic interests over political considerations
and was willing to use bilateral aid and economic contacts
as a means of breaking through South Africa's political
alienation. Verwoerd, through the evolution of the policy
of separate development, hoped to create a commonwealth of
nations in South Africa. He also sought to draw the High
Commission territories (Bechuanaland, Lesotho and Swaziland)
into the homelands design. He envisaged a common market
together with a consultative political body of free Black
and White states in Southern Africa [Ref. 24: p. 25] and
[Ref. 25: pp. 173-174].
The ideas of regional economic cooperation in Southern
Africa began to receive academic attention and to gain
intellectual acceptability in the 1960's. By the late
1960's South Africa was clearly the hub of the new Southern
African economy, this was the result of several development,
including the Portugal's decision to open its territories to
investments, the independence of the British territories in
Southern Africa and South Africa's own flexing of muscle via
its outward policy [Ref. 25: p. 246]. Regional trading
patterns changed in response to these new realities. In
1968 the South African economists J. A. Lombard, J.J. Stadler
and P.J. van der Merwe gave impetus to the idea of
systematic cooperation, identifying it as an alternative to
isolation or integration. This would produce, they argued,
the optimum combination of politics and economics. Greater
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inter-regional trade would also reduce the region's
dependence on the rest of the world.
The assassination of Prime Minister Verwoerd brought BJ
Vorster to that position in September 1966. Within a year he
embarked on a reorientation of South African thinking about
regional relations, 9 if not a whole new policy itself. This
received the label of "outward movement" or "outward policy"
and had Africa as its focal point. "The Republic's economic
pre-eminence gives her a pre-eminence in all other spheres."
[Ref. 25: p. 247] Such thinking in 1967/68 by Foreign
Minister Muller led him to tell the students of the
University of Stellenbosch that South Africa was now
assuming her rightful leadership role in Africa.
Pronouncements such as this by Muller and the new Prime
Minister Vorster paved the way for the outward movement by
making it acceptable to White South African public opinion.




black states. This policy was launched at a time
9 Adrian Guelke identifies other analyses of the outward
movement; (a) South Africa needed markets for her
manufactured goods (b) South Africa was looking for
domination of the region similar to the United States in
Latin America (c) South Africa was seeking an image in the
West as a stable and prosperous state enjoying the goodwill
of her neighbors. [Ref. 27]
1
° The American Heritage Dictionary defines "modus
vivendi" as (1) a way of life (2) a temporary agreement
between contending parties pending a final settlement; a
practical compromise. Also see Barber, "South Africa's
Foreign Policy 1945-1970", pages 228-229 for a more Marxist
interpretation of South Africa's need to project outwardly.
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(1967/1968) of strong white confidence in South Africa's
economic power, military strength and its ability to
overcome dangers in the future and thus be able to retain
control of the state.
Outward movement, also labeled the outward policy, was a
broad based attempt by the South African government to
improve its international status and position. The
objectives of the outward movement included;
1. Establishing a leading role in Africa for South
Africa.
2. Ensuring military security in Southern Africa.
3. Building an extensive network of economic contacts.
4. Strengthening South Africa's identification with the
west
.
5. Preventing external intervention in South Africa's
affairs. [Ref. 25: p. 227]
The government did not see this new initiative as an altera-
tion of objectives, but rather as a change of methods and
strategy necessitated by changes in the external environment
Vorster sought to maintain "the closest economic and techno-
logical cooperation among all the countries of the region,
for their mutual benefit and joint development." 11 [Ref. 26:
p. 10] This was aimed at Africa following the wisdom that
lx Barber provides a more cynical view; "South Africa
sought to increase the security and wealth of the Republic
by surrounding her with dependent territories which would
put political stability as well as economic and technical
cooperation high on their list of priorities." [Ref. 25: p.
243]
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for South Africa the key to better worldwide relations was
better relations with its neighbors. Vorster became person-
ally involved in regional diplomacy by meeting with Prime
Minister Jonathan of Lesotho in 1967 and a a Malawian dele-
gation and Prime Minister Smith of Rhodesia, and making
trips to Malawi, Rhodesia and to West Africa to meet the
leaders of Ivory Coast, Senegal and Liberia. The meeting
with President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast led to South
African Airways landing rights in the Ivory Coast
.
However, closer contact with neighboring states (unlike
more distant black African states) did not lead to an
exchange of diplomats. Foreign Minister Muller in 1968
explained; "That is because it is impossible to communicate
directly with those distant countries as we do in the case
of our .. .neighboring states." [Ref. 24: p. 50] Attempts to
expand dialogue were curtailed because of opposition by the
Organization of African Unity and growing African
frustration over the Rhodesian and South West Africa issues.
Though Muller did not refer to transportation
connections directly, contacts through trade representatives
and inter-organizational relationships (as between the SAR
and other railroads) were virtually all that remained for
South Africa. By this time, other technical cooperation
organizations had been abolished or absorbed into the
Organization of African Unity (OAU).
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Pronouncements such as Foreign Minister Muller's above,
opened the doors for the role transportation was to play in
foreign policy in the next ten to fifteen years. Dr.
Jacobus G.H. Loubser assumed the position of General Manager
of the South Africa Railway and Harbour Administration
(SAR&H) in 1970, a most opportune time. The economic boom of
the 1960 's both required and enabled him to expand the SAR&H
and the atmosphere within government allowed him to pursue
his ideas of "transport diplomacy" as a superb complement to
the Prime Minister's new outward movement.
Indications of the relative success of outward movement
include the renegotiation of the South African Customs Union
(S.A.C.U.) agreement in 1969 making it more favorable for
the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS countries). 12
The less than overtly hostile position of the moderate
governments of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi was
12 The December 1969 S.A.C.U. agreement between South
Africa and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS countries)
provided for the levying of uniform customs excise and sales
taxes, the free interchange of duty paid goods imported from
the outside the common customs area, imposition of
additional duties for protective purposes by the BLS
countries regulation of the marketing of agricultural
produce and revision of former method of calculating the
division of customs, excise and sales duty revenues. It also
opened Swazi access to the port of Lourenco-Marques
(Maputo). [Ref. 1: pp. 393-402] For a more detailed analysis
of the SACU agreement see pages 86-92 of Shaw Timothy.
"Southern Africa: Dependence, Interdependence and
Independence in a Regional Subsystem", pp. 81-98 in
Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa : Papers on a
Regional Subsystem
,
edited by Shaw, Timothy and Heard,
Kenneth A. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America,
1977.
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also considered by South Africa as a success of outward
movement. Through communications with these countries South
Africa was able to give effect to its offer of aid and
assistance to Black states which along "with trade links the
Republic relied on to draw the countries of southern Africa
closer together" [Ref. 24: p. 38]. This materialized in such
ventures as the construction of the Malawian capital
(Lilongwe) and infrastructural improvements in the BLS
states. Thus South Africa began to use trade, aid and
technical assistance in a functionalist strategy which it
hoped would result in positive effects in the political
realm. [Ref. 26: p. 11].
One of South Africa's main concerns regarding regional
cooperation was to maintain the existing political order in
Southern Africa, which included maintaining the existing
domestic political order in each country (ie.
non-interference with each other). Unless the unwritten rule
of non-disclosure of foreign policy debates within the
government is broken, one will probably never know for sure
whether South Africa deliberately sought to make its
neighbors dependent on the Republic. What is clear is that
South Africa has been principally concerned with the
behavior of its neighbors and has sought to influence that
behavior.
Unfortunately, for outward movement, South Africa's
actions toward Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of
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Independence (UDI) were easily interpreted by Black African
States as a commitment to support white neighboring
governments. Conversely, the late 1960 's was seen by South
Africa as a time of increased "terrorism" and "communist
domination", and Prime Minister Vorster was not willing to
tolerate these perceived threats in Southern Africa. He was
determined to stop them, even by militarily going beyond
South Africa's borders. Efforts at non-aggression pacts
with independent black states in 1970 were unsuccessful.
In the early 1970' s South Africa sought a resolution to
the Rhodesian UDI issue. This was designed to prevent its'
damaging South Africa's attempts at outward movement and her
general international standing, perhaps even reduce the
verbal and diplomatic attacks on South Africa for keeping
Rhodesia's lifelines open. The Portuguese coup of April
1974 awakened Kaunda to the opportunities for diplomacy.
Concomitantly, in the early 1970 's South Africa began to
seek a solution to the Rhodesian UDI issue in an effort to
prevent further its damaging South Africa's efforts at
outward movement and general international standing. The
Portuguese coup and the pending independence of Angola and
Mozambique catalyzed South African and Zambian willingness 13
13 Shaw and Mugomba make a case that the requirement for
cheaper means of exporting copper and receiving imports to
satisfy the growing consumer market was the true motive for
the pragmatism in foreign policy shown by Kaunda. See
[Ref. 28]
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to discuss regional issues. October 5, 1974 was the dawning
of new initiatives closer to home (labeled detente) as
leaders of South Africa and Zambia spoke about "peace,
progress and development in Southern Africa." [Ref. 28: p.
397] On October 23, 1974 Prime Minister Vorster informed the
country that South Africa had come to a crossroads and would
have to choose between peace and escalating conflict.
Ambassador to the U.N., R.F. "Pik" Botha, informed the world
the next day that South Africa was committed to eliminating
racial discrimination. With these pronouncements an era of
detente began.
Though detente was initially directed at resolving the
regional issues of Rhodesian independence and South West
Africa there was a wider hope by South Africa that detente
would draw Southern Africa together in a strong bloc. This
bloc would promote common social and economic interests and
would present a united front towards the real enemy, the
Soviet Union and their 'agents', militant black
nationalists. [Ref. 29: p. 4]
The highwater mark of detente came less than a year
later in August 1975 at the Victoria Falls peace talks in
which PM Vorster and President Kaunda of Zambia brought
Prime Minister Ian Smith of Rhodesia together with the
Rhodesian rebel leaders. Though not a diplomatic corps per
se, the SAR&H played an instrumental role in the mechanics
of setting up this conference. During the talks Loubser even
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persuaded the Rhodesians to guarantee an open Zambian border
for the transit of Zambian trains to South Africa.
The Victoria Falls talks failed to resolve the conflict
in Rhodesia. This failed initiative, along with South
Africa's intervention in Angola, finished the detente era.
The loss of the cordon sanitaire provided by the Portuguese
colonies of Mozambique and Angola, an increase in
international ostracism (eg. 1977 U.N. arms sanctions) and
increased internal unrest (eg. SOWETO 1976) sealed the fate
of detente. Out of this came what Geldenhuys calls a
"defensive" strategy (one could also use the term "less
optimistic") of the Constellation of States.
Though the term "constellation of states" had been used
by Prime Minister Vorster, the Botha government's (1978 to
the present) revival and definition of this policy give
authorship to his administration.
Shortly after election as Prime Minister, the former
Minister of Defense, P.W. Botha, introduced a number of
changes to the government. These included relationships
within the government as well as the relationship between
the government and the private business sector. This latter
initiative was fostered by P.W. Botha, culminating in the
Carleton Center Conference of November 1979 and the Good
Hope Conference in 1981. This new partnership between
government and business flowed from the new Prime Minister's
emphasis on economic cooperation and development in Southern
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Africa. This, in turn, was a key element of his proposed
Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS).
P.W. Botha's constellation was conceived as part of a
total national strategy. The idea of a total national
strategy grew out of a belief that South Africa faced a
"total onslaught". "Total onslaught" is the term used to
describe the strategy of overthrowing South Africa's present
order by military, political, diplomatic, religious,
psychological and cultural means. The enemies that wage this
onslaught are not considered to be limited to only
communists but include the West which sees South Africa as a
threat to Western interests in the rest of Africa. Adoption
of the total national strategy also led to a
"rationalization" or reorganization of the civil service.
Botha gave the idea of a constellation new backing and
new prominence, making it a major foreign policy initiative.
In March 1979 P.W. Botha described a constellation as "a
common approach (of Southern African nations) in the
security field, the economic field and even the political
field." [Ref. 24: p. 41] P.W. Botha tried to reassure leery
neighbors by describing a constellation as a grouping of
"states that derive from their fixed proximity to each other
a common interest whilst maintaining cheir individual
sovereign status. This concept thus specifically excludes a
satellite relationship...." [Ref. 30: p. 51] It was assumed
that a group of moderate states led by responsible leaders
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motivated by common, pragmatic interests would come into
being. This would lead to cooperation within the existing
political order. The political will for this cooperation
would "be strengthened by expanded relations in the
non-political technical and economic fields." [Ref. 31:
p. 20]
Foreign Minister Pik Botha provided one of the first
definitive explanations of the constellation on 7 March 1979
before the Swiss-South African Association. South Africa, he
said, envisions:
1. That the countries of Southern Africa are bound by
common interests in the areas of security,
agriculture, commerce and transportation, health,
labor, power and energy.
2. A constellation as an opportunity for regional
solutions to regional problems.
3. A constellation as a means by which the moderate
countries of Southern Africa can face a Marxist
threat
.
4. A constellation would join states in cooperative
self-defense
.
5. The constellation would operate on the basis of the
existing political order. This implies that age old
insistence of non-interference in domestic politics.
[Ref. 26: pp. 19-22]
This last point has significant implications for the
recognition of the independent homelands and Namibia. This
point has also played a significant role in the lack of
success in attracting to the Constellation any states other
than independent homelands. And once again, economic links
between states hold a crucial role in the expected success
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of the constellation of states. Not only was it expected
that economic links such as transportation would create
closer political linkages but some in the government saw
closer diplomatic ties as inevitable because of these
non-political contacts. The Prime Minister has assigned
much responsibility for making the constellation work to the
private sector. Private sector cooperation and coordination
would not only pave the way for inter-governmental
structures but will also help avoid any difficulties arising
from official government to government overtures. Herein
lies the South African Transport Services' call to arms.
Shortly after Robert Mugabe's electoral victory in 1980,
following the Lancaster House agreement, he demonstrated his
intention not to work within a South African constellation
by denouncing the idea and joining the Southern African
Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC). Botha's
earlier reservation of a place in the constellation for the
ill-fated Bishop Muzorewa's Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government
undoubtedly did not aid in endearing Mugabe to the
constellation idea. Because -of Zimbabwe's strong
manufacturing sector and its geographic position as a
transportation crossroads for the SADCC countries, its
denial of membership in South Africa's Constellation
effectively killed the idea, far more than any other
majority ruled country's refusal to join.
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In so far as the Constellation is concerned, what has
evolved is an inner constellation of South Africa and the
independent homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana , Venda and
Ciskei. These entities are joined by a Multilateral
Development Council of Ministers and at the department and
technical level the Multilateral Economic and Finance
Committee which has seven Multilateral Technical Committees,
one of which is transportation. In May 1980 the
Constellation of States formed an inter-state transport
committee, composed of senior officials from the four
constellation 'countries'. Subsequently, this committee has
appointed tourism, technical and civil aviation working
groups. [Ref. 24: p. 155]
In terms of its original objectives of an organization
of seven to ten states of over 40 million people the
constellation of states has failed. Furthermore South
Africa now has another contentious organization on its hands
which may form only another obstacle to better relations
with independent Black states. Also these same independent
black states have formed their own "counter-constellation",
SADCC
. And though few people believe that it will actually
succeed in its principle aim of severing dependence on South
Africa, its very continued existence speaks for its success
where South Africa has failed.
The South Africa Transport Services, SATS, however, has
succeeded where the government has not by not only
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maintaining but also strengthening organizational ties to
transport organizations of neighboring states. In this way-
one may see hope for improved interstate relations.
The failure of closer regional ties in the late 1970'
s
was followed by stepped up ANC and SWAPO violence in the
early 1980' s. The South African government saw a direct link
between the increase in violence and the organizations'
presence in Mozambique and Lesotho (ANC) and Angola (SWAPO).
This threat to South Africa's security has been countered by
continued occupation of Angolan territory, support to UNITA
and RENAMO and raids on ANC hideouts in Maseru, Lesotho and
Maputo, Mozambique.
These actions have been described as a policy of
"destabilization" (a deliberate program to undermine a
neighboring state's government possibly with the aim of its
overthrow), and have also been termed a "forward" or
"offensive" foreign policy. Throughout these periods of
hostilities SATS has maintained continuous business
relations with its sister organizations.
B. DR. LOUBSER AND TRANSPORT DIPLOMACY
Jacobus G.H. Loubser was General Manager during the
period 1970-1983 of the South African Railways and Harbours
Administration (SAR&H) and after a name change on 1 October
1981 to the South African Transport Services (SATS). Loubser
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originated the term "transport diplomacy" to describe his
philosophy and actions in relations between SAR&H and their
corresponding transport organizations in other Southern
African states. This section will describe Loubser's
philosophy and principles of implementing his concept of
transport diplomacy independently and as an integral part of
South Africa's regional foreign policy. Loubser's personal
conviction that through the non-political agency of the
railways closer and more harmonious working relationships
could be established with neighboring states meshed with and
complemented the South African government's desire for
dialogue and detente in the early 1970' s, and more recently,
a Constellation of Southern African states.
Loubser started working in the SAR&H at the ground
level. In these positions he gained an appreciation and
understanding of not only the mechanics of the railway
business but also the employees and their needs and
motivations. Contacts and relations made in these early days
paid many dividends in improving morale and labor relations
years later while General Manager. He was the youngest
General Manager of the SAR&H and infused the SAR&H
administration with a new sense of purpose and positive
attitude
.
South Africa's rapid industrialization in the 1960 's
caused an increase in the volume of freight traffic for the
South African Railways (SAR). The early 1970 's found the
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SAR&H struggling to keep services running for this rapidly
expanding South African economy. The difficulties
manifested themselves in a dearth of rail capacity for high
volume exports, causing the SAR&H to be "the biggest single
bottleneck to the country's industrial growth." [Ref. 32:
p. 23] Loubser undertook the task of improving the railways
efficiency and effectiveness. The solution was found in
technological innovations providing for "higher speeds,
bigger loads and faster turn- around times," [Ref. 33: p. 3]
capital improvements (doubling mainline tracks, purchasing
rolling stock and electrification of lines), finding the
best medium of transport for the commodity and end user
assistance in financing projects (eg. Richards Bay bulk
handling facility and the Sishen- Saldanha line).
The lack of competent lower-grade staff, the result of
the Colour Bar and White union strength, was a problem
Loubser had to face throughout his tenure. His solution was
based on a close and continuous working relationship with
trade unions and with labor representation of all races. The
practice of working closely with labor continued throughout
his thirteen year tenure and was instrumental in improving




Loubser subscribes to Hans Morgenthou's view that
diplomacy is "the art of bringing the different elements of
national power to bear with maximum effect upon those points
in the international situation which concern the national
interest most directly." [Ref. 34: p. 3] Diplomacy thus
seeks to use a nation's power to its greatest advantage.
Citing the Greek historian Thucydides , Loubser argues that a
diplomat gains maximum advantage by cultivating bonds
between people based on common interests. These will be
molded by increased contacts, an affinity of values and
mutual understanding and cooperation [Ref. 34: p. 3].
Because transportation is one of the strongest links between
nations, the conduit of commerce and communication, Loubser
believed there was a place for the economic instrument of
transportation in the political world of international
relations
.
"Transport diplomacy can thus be regarded as the art
of enabling the transport potential of a country to perform
a maximum role in that country's relations with other
countries, for the furtherance of its own as well as the
common interests." [Ref. 34: p. 5] In South Africa's
situation of political isolation, transport diplomacy was
viewed by Loubser as the strongest and most strategic
antidote to isolation, a powerful means to realize the
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Republic's potential for creating prosperity and bringing
about stability in the subcontinent [Ref. 34: p. 8].
In the world of international politics Loubser
became a not wholly traditional player by harnessing his
personal and professional stature and prestige to his
powerful tool, the SAR&H, to influence South African foreign
policy formulation and execution. Furthermore, he sought to
increase cooperation among Southern African states through
these means.
The strength of this element, called the SAR&H,
particularly in relation to its neighboring organizations,
has been shown in previous sections. Most notable is its
huge personnel roster and budget, making it the largest
organization in South Africa if not the whole continent.
(In 1983-84 SATS had a total of 240,863 personnel and
expenditures in excess of Rand 6,457 million, approximately
US $3 Billion.) Thus, its clear importance to the
government and economy of South Africa. Internationally, it
is vital for the trading links and services that it provides
to neighboring countries as far north as Zaire.
In an April 1982 lecture entitled "The Function of
Transport as a Line of Inter-nation Communication in
Africa", Loubser summed up his philosophy of development in
Southern Africa:
1. Africa is different from the rest of the world and
should not be placed in any preconceived mold.
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2. To help the developing countries, what is needed is
guidance, training and education along with money,
machinery and food.
3. One must respect the pride of the African
individually and nationally.
4. South Africa has the knowledge, experience and
technology to help other African countries.
Specifically this is African born, bred and tested.
5. Allow South Africa to be used, its expertise and
facilities, because South Africa can play a dominant
role in keeping trade routes open. [Ref. 35]
South African Transport Services believes it can and has
fulfilled the needs implied in each of these points.
Furthermore, Loubser feels that SATS is able to assist
neighboring countries in the area of transport (especially
rail and harbors) that will be the deciding factor in deter-
mining the economic survival of so many independent coun-
tries in Africa. Though the change in General Manager in
1983 produced a change in personal interests, the inter-
organizational relationships between SATS and foreign trans-
port organizations remains the same and continues to grow
stronger through the inter-personal relations of the staffs.
a. Guiding Principles of Transport Diplomacy
Believing in the dominant position of SAR in
relation to other nations and rail systems in the region, 1 '*
1
''Many communication channels of Southern Africa,
besides transport, lead to or through South Africa. This is
the result of heritage and modern efficiency. In transport,
South Africa plays a dominant role in keeping routes open to
her land-locked neighbors.
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Loubser developed a philosophy of transport diplomacy that
held that South Africa's railways could allow South Africa
either to play a leading role in development of Southern
Africa or incur the increasing hostility and animosity of
neighboring states. Ultimately, Loubser believed that
"normal trade relations are far more preferable than any
other less friendly action and that this in reality
discourages any alternative attitude." [Ref. 36] Therefore,
SAR&H would proceed using the following principles as
guidelines
:
1. Provide assistance only when asked for it.
2. Base assistance on pragmatic business principles; ie.
offered at cost and not as charity.
3. Provide assistance in such a manner that it will
stimulate development without infringing on the sense
of independence of the country concerned, but rather
will help it to help itself. [Ref. 34: p. 12]
Points number one and two cannot be stressed
enough for these are not just the guiding principles of
transport diplomacy but the essence of all SAR&H and SATS'
actions with foreign transport organizations. For Loubser
this is based on a desire to do business not charity, the
Christian belief of turning the other cheek even when
repeatedly smitten, and a realization of political reality
such that in no way does the SAR&H want to be seen or
interpreted as forcing or coercing in any manner neighboring
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transport organizations and thus their governments. 15 Based
on conversations with SATS officials, these principles
appear to be firmly entrenched not jsut in the corporate
heirarchy but throughout the organization's management.
In practice transport diplomacy takes various
forms to include:
1. Sales of services by SATS to foreign users such as
maintenance of track, locomotives and trucks 16 and
repair and maintenance of aircraft. This includes the
hiring of equipment to neighboring rail systems. In
October 1982 the following locomotives and trucks
were on hire; 6 diesel locomotives to Zaire, 10
diesel locomotives to Zambia, 8 steam locomotives to
Mozambique, 9 steam locomotives to Zimbabwe, 10 steam
locomotives to Swaziland and 109 wagons to Swaziland.
[Ref. 37]
2. Management personnel and technicians provided by SATS
for managing and training foreign railway management
and technicians. Former SATS personnel are currently
the General Managers of Malawi and Swaziland railways
and SATS operates the small spur line in Lesotho for
the Lesotho government
.
3. Exchange of technical information and research
conducted by SATS. The RSA has conducted the research
to give it the worlds largest and most efficient
narrow gauge railroad (1065mm). Its equipment and
techniques are designed for African conditions and
are compatible with most rail systems in southern
Africa. This information and research is freely
exchanged on an ad hoc basis as well as at regional
transportation conferences held periodically
throughout Southern Africa.
15 This was revealed in conversations with SATS employees
and officials. In conversations with officials of recipient
nation's transport services this same attitude was
expressed, though somewhat more hesitantly.
ls Note the words 'trucks' and 'wagons' are what
Americans call "railroad freight cars". A 'coach' is a
railroad passenger car. A 'lorry' is what Americans mean
when referring to highway load carrying vehicles.
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4. Research and planning is conducted for neighboring
rail systems by SATS personnel. A most recent example
is the design recommendations for a transport system
to enable Botswana to export its coal reserves. Due
to a country's skepticism of South Africa's
self-interest they will frequently insist on another
Eastern or Western Bloc assessment. But, as a SATS
official said, "Once "they realize that we're telling
the truth and that we have the best product for the
best price, they come right back, sometimes a little
sheepishly." [Ref. 38]
5. Capital investment and actual construction of some
facilities most notably, in recent history, the
Nacala rail line and the Rutenga-Beit Bridge
connection.
Frequently the reluctance to urge or even offer
assistance for fear of appearing to seek domination has
resulted in additional loss and cost for the foreign
railroad. Two examples are the Zambian reluctance to
conduct trade through Rhodesia and then South African ports
(despite the guarantees of operation and delivery by Prime
Minister Vorster and Dr. Loubser) until the country was
found to have critically low food stocks and be in desperate
financial straits. SAR&H foresight enabled it to rapidly
respond to Zambia's request for assistance. More recently,
following the destruction of a key railway bridge in
Mozambique traffic to and from Maputo was halted for over
two weeks until the Mozambique Railways (CFM) requested that
SATS send in a team to repair the bridge. Within two days
rail traffic was once again flowing on the line and
Mozambique began to earn foreign exchange.
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On the other hand efforts at assistance also
have been interpreted by critics of South Africa as
"destabilizing" or as elements of South Africa's
destabilization of its neighbors. The SATS finds this wholly-
erroneous. SATS' own self-interest is in stabilizing
economic conditions and aiding in development, thus
relieving political pressures on South Africa.
"Destabilization" is seen by Loubser as a "convenient means
to castigate South Africa and cover up the inherent
destabilizing built into the economic and political
structures of some neighboring countries' regimes."
[Ref. 39]
Though it makes for extremely favourable public
relations, the identification of transport diplomacy as
purely altruistic, good-neighborliness must be labeled as
naive at best. Though positive benefits accrue to all
parties, especially South Africa's less developed neighbors,
cooperation with neighboring countries and their transport
organizations is undertaken for two reasons; economic gain
and political/strategic.
The economic objectives are straightforward;
SAR&H (now SATS) is a state owned business that by law must
be run on business principles. Though the debate over the
interpretation of this phrase has gone on for 75 years,
Loubser and his successor Dr. Grove have stridently sought
profitable undertakings for the SAR&H/ SATS. In regards to
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foreign commerce South Africa's neighbors are a lucrative
source of income for SAR&H/SATS. In the words of Loubser "in
the present juncture when the domestic demand for transport
is not fully using the available capacity, the South African
Railways is thankful to carry payable traffic from outside
our borders. There can be no question that the Railways
involvement in Africa does not rest on purely economic
grounds. The Railways therefore complies in this respect
with the basic legal injunction of operation according to
business principles." [Ref. 34: p. 22]
Relations with Mozambique in the past ten years
provides a poignant example of this aim. Due to over 80
years of working together SAR&H was in a favorable position
to understand the needs and be able to provide continued
assistance to the newly independent Mozambique. In a similar
manner Maputo was the key port (closest and cheapest )for
imports and exports to the Transvaal, the major mining and
industrial center of South Africa. By October 1982 the
development of Richard's Bay, a bulk material handling port,
and the projected rail link between Komatipoort and
Swaziland had progressed to a point that Loubser was able to
claim that South Africa is totally independent of its
neighbors in transport. Though he conceded that stability
in the region is key to continued stability in the Republic
and thus South Africa cannot sleep easily while its
neighbors go hungry. [Ref. 37]
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Despite the lack of diplomatic relations and the
anti-South African rhetoric from Maputo "all possible
assistance was offered . . .with due diplomacy at the highest
level" to the Mozambican railway authorities with a view
toward normalizing traffic. Assistance rendered by the SAR
included steam and diesel locomotives as early as April
1975, train control apparatus, fork-lifts and spare parts.
Also many diesel locomotives and a large number of railway
trucks were repaired. Personnel for planning and trainers
were provided. Such close ties paved the way in 1976 toward
retrieving 169 SAR trucks and 186 Zairian RR trucks that
were trapped on the Beira-Umtali line when Mozambique closed
its border with Rhodesia. The Zairian wagons were duly
returned to Zaire. These close working relationships have
continued to the present to the point of daily and continual
communication between the two organizations, SAR&H/SATS and
CFM.
Along with these good personal and
organizational relations, SAR is receiving payment for this
assistance and services. Formerly this was in foreign
exchange but due to a lack of such in Mozambique, payment is
made as an accounting credit against charges to South Africa
for transporting goods on Mozambican rail lines [Ref. 40].
Perhaps more importantly for South Africa and SATS, it is an
economic necessity that the railway line to, and the harbor
of Maputo remain accessible to South Africa [Ref. 34: p.
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22]. Consequently, it is also in South Africa's own
interest to provide technical and operational assistance.
Interdependence of the Railways and the domestic economy
means that what is good for the country is also good for the
Railways, and vice versa [Ref. 34: p. 23].
SAR is primarily a business venture which makes
use of opportunities to earn money from transport
activities. However, the Railway's involvement in the rest
of Africa does not arise solely from financial
considerations. If this were the case then the Railways
would have to halt operations when it begins to operate at a
loss. This is not the policy of the Railways for "as a
transport organization with one leg firmly in the public
sector and the other in the private sector, the Railways
with its involvement in Africa, offers unique opportunities
which are not accessible to any government department. . . ."
[Ref. 34: p. 23] Loubser believed that the railways had a
"greater calling" and he saw his duty "to use these
opportunities to the fullest extent for the benefit of South
Africa in many directions and in particular in the
international political sphere." [Ref. 34: p. 23]
Specific political results that South Africa
feels are gained from these relations include:
1. Open communication channels which lay the foundations
for better understanding on a personal level which
lead to better understanding between nations.
2. Perpetuation of an image of South Africa's good
intentions towards Black Africa, thus avoiding the
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conclusion that South Africa is forsaking the rest of
Africa.
3. Normalization of trade relations which create a forum
for discussions at other levels and form a basis for
an unfolding of the outward policy and possibly also
the constellation of states." [Ref. 34: p. 25]
4. Recognition by foreign transport organizations and
their governments for the efficiency, quality of
service and integrity of SATS.
Men as politically astute and knowledgeable of
the Southern African region as South Africa's politicians
and businessmen are not blind to the strategic implications
of such close cooperation as that conducted by SATS and its
foreign sister organizations. Transportation and the
corresponding revenues and the ancillary development that
accompanies it is crucial to the economies of every country
in Southern Africa. Consequently, if South Africa through
its parastatal transport organization is able to gain an
intimate knowledge of the transport networks of its
neighbors it may be able, in time of need, to control or
destroy these systems. More subtle is the increased
reliance of other Southern African nations on South Africa's
rail lines, ports, technology and personnel which would
enable South Africa to apply pressures to the economic
jugular of its neighbors.
Even the hint of such actions on behalf of the
SATS brings vehement denials from Loubser and other SATS
officials. And so it should, because these individuals and
SATS as an organization are "opposed to the use of transport
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to achieve non-economic objectives." [Ref. 34: p. 25]
However, this is not only contrary to his thoughts cited
earlier in this paper but it is only naive to believe that
other officials of the government have not also realized the
potential for offensive use of transportation. This was
particularly true during the late 1970 's and early 1980' s as
the cordon sanitaire crumbled around South Africa and the
advance of Marxism was seen as suddenly knocking on the
door.
None of this is to suggest that South Africa is
seeking, or SATS is aiding in a quest for economic or
political domination via transport diplomacy. But it does
mean to suggest that South Africa aims for cooperation with
its neighbors along with maintaining a policy of
non-interference in internal affairs. Loubser claims that
"South Africa will trade and cooperate with any African
state for mutual economic benefit, provided that a measure
of recognition and "non-aggression" is offered in return.
For it is our principal aim to achieve stability, peace and
prosperity for all peoples of our sub-continent in the
future." [Ref. 39] Through this cooperation the transport
system of South Africa, that so closely interlocks with its
neighbors, may prove to be the trump card in South Africa's
fight against the inroads of diplomatic isolation and its
perception of a Marxist threat in Southern Africa. At the
worst, even critics of this functional hypothesis
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acknowledge that if infrastructural cooperation does not
lead to closer political ties, it does limit disintegration.
b. Results of Transport Diplomacy
Some specific results of transport diplomacy
include
;
1. A 1979 business agreement with Mozambique, a Marxist
government and member of the OAU.
2. The pooling of regular air services with all
countries south of Tanzania, Zaire and Angola. At one
point agreements had been reached with many African
nations for overflight and landing rights but on the
eve of initiating such service an overzealous
newspaper reporter killed the agreement with a
headline of "SA BEATS AFRICA." [Ref. 38]
3. Orderly transfer of rolling stock across national
boundaries presently hampered only by inefficient
cargo handling on some lines and civil war activities
in Mozambique and Angola.
More general results include;
1. The creation of trade between all states in Southern
Africa estimated by Loubser to be worth at least a
billion dollars per year in 1981.
2. Railway links, through SATS staff in various
countries, have become a line of communication
between governments. When a South African Trade
Representative exists in a country he assumes the
consular duties. However, SATS personnel have been
used by South Africa and foreign countries as
diplomatic couriers and negotiators when no
"official" diplomatic relations have existed.
Similarly, the foreign nation has viewed the SATS
representatives in the same manner.
3. The building of mutual respect and understanding at
the personal level among transport officials from
different political persuasions and cultures. This is




4. SATS, through its work with and in other states has
added to the image and perception of South Africa as
a reliable supplier and trusted commercial partner.
It may require a leap of faith for some to
imagine how trade creation and improved personal
relationships can lead to interdependence and regional
stability. However, it is this very faith which permeates
conversations, literature and public presentations of
virtually all SATS personnel. Consequently, it is reasonable
to assume that they will continue to work towards their
vision of regional stability in transportation- - if only out
of self interest of self - fulfillment
.
C. FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
There is a partial overlap between the following section
and its predecessor. Because they cover a similar time
period and the information is presented chronologically this
is unavoidable. The focus of the following section is on
the role of the transport bureaucracy in the formulation of
South Africa's regional foreign policy. In order to remove
any hint of causality this section has been segregated from
the previous section which concerned itself with the outcome
of that formulation.
This section will briefly explain the process of foreign
policy formulation in South Africa, by first summarizing
some background history of the changes in it. The process
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during the past 10-15 years will then be examined for this
is the period when, through transport diplomacy, the
transport sector of government was able to play a role in
policy formulation. Generally, foreign policy formulation
in these years is considered in two phases. In the first
phase, until Vorster's resignation in 1978, foreign policy
was formulated within a loose informal system guided by the
Prime Minister and the State Security Council (SSC) played
an increasingly important role in the latter years of this
period. The second phase, 1978 to the present, policy
formulation has been in a more formal and tightly structured
system in which the SSC plays an increasingly important
role. Given that the subject of this thesis is
transportation as an element of foreign policy, particular
emphasis will be placed on the role the transportation
bureaucracy has played (or quite often not played) in South
African foreign policy formulation.
The following discussion is of necessity general because
the decision making process has not been exposed to public
scrutiny. Therefore it is not always possible to establish
with certainty who made specific decisions or on what
grounds those decisions were based. Furthermore, this
discussion is not to imply a primary role for the
transportation bureaucracy or any individual of that
bureaucracy in the formulation of South African foreign
policy during the past 35 years. Loubser, during his tenure
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as General Manager of the South African Railway and Harbours
Administration (SAR&H), did play a key role in implementing
actions toward' s South Africa's regional goals during the
years 1970-1983, and through his transport diplomacy
strengthened international (regional) relations Furthermore
he was able to initiate business activities which overflowed
into the diplomatic arena and which complemented entirely
the policies of outward movement, detente and the
constellation of states. However, it would be attributing
to him a far too generous role to label him as anything more
than one of the foreign policy elite.





Throughout the early years of Nationalist rule
(certainly until 1972 and the creation of the State Security
Council, the SSC) the cabinet was the locus of decision
making power. Though PM Malan maintained for himself the
External Affairs portfolio, his impact on foreign affairs
cannot be equated with that of his predecessors Hertzog and
Smuts. He also more frequently sought the opinion of two of
his cabinet ministers on foreign policy matters, Dr. Dinges
,
Minister of the Interior and Mr P.O. Sauer, Minister of
Transport. And on occasion he used them to represent South
Africa in the international forum [Ref. 24: p. 20].
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Though he may have brought with him a bureaucratic
loyalty to the South African Railway and Harbour
Administration, Minister of Transport Sauer was a long time
politician and it cannot be assumed that he sought any
particular place for the SAR&H in regional relations. This
is particularly true of the post-war era when the SAR&H was
struggling to regain its wartime losses and did not have the
resources for foreign relations other than maintaining the
flow of trade.
During the Verwoerd era the Cabinet remained the
center of foreign policy decision making, though the
position of the Minister of External Affairs was raised in
prominence, the result of the appointment of Eric Louw as
Minister of External Affairs by Prime Minister Strijdom in
1955. Louw not only had the portfolio to himself but also
the confidence of the Prime Minister to allow him a free
rein. Foreign Minister Louw also reorganized the Department
of External Affairs in an effort to improve contacts with
Africa. This was accomplished in 1959 by establishing a
separate Africa Division within the Department.
Geldenhuys identifies the Parliament as having
slight influence in matters of foreign affairs, debating
only topics such as relations with Rhodesia after their
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965.
Parliament evidently was persuaded to refrain from debate on
delicate foreign policy issues as a show of national unity
or due to "security" considerations. [Ref. 24: pp. 28-29]
85
During the Verwoerdian era the business community-
was virtually the only non-official group of significant
strength which from time to time may have helped to shape
foreign policy. Being the largest business in the country,
the SAR&H can be included in this grouping. Though,
business' influence simply supported steps which made South
Africa popular and opposed those which made it unpopular
[Ref. 24: p. 30]. The Department of External/Foreign
Affairs nonetheless valued the role the businessman could
play in providing useful contacts abroad and the potential
of trade in paving the way for the flag [Ref. 24: p. 30].
Economic contacts were used to retain and reinforce other
contacts and in particular blunt attempts to organize action
against the Republic.
Geldenhuys identifies Mr. Steyn, Deputy Secretary of
Commerce and Industry as carrying particular responsiblities
in regards to South Africa-Rhodesia relations during UDI
.
The Minister of Transport and General Manager of the SAR&H
are not specifically identified in his analysis but with the
advent of UDI they were forced into a heightened interest of
regional politics. This is due to the disruptions and
alterations of rail service and trade with countries to the
north, and South Africa's involvement in facilitating the
failure of economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Business,
for them
,
could not have been "as usual".
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2. Prime Minister Vorster 1966-78
During the Vorster years, 1966-1978, decision making
was often a haphazard process involving only a tiny number
of participants. Prime Minister Vorster was a skillful
chairman of his cabinet and invited wide discussion of
foreign policy topics. He then provided the Cabinet with a
firm lead on his decision. Quite frequently though, Vorster
displayed a preference for unstructured decision making
involving only one other person or a very small group.
[Ref. 24: pp. 74-82]
Although the Prime Minister as head of government is
ultimately responsible for foreign policy, it is wrong to
attribute all initiatives to him personally or to him and
the Foreign Ministry jointly. In many instances foreign
policy initiatives originated elsewhere in the machinery of
government [Ref. 24: p. 72]. Loubser and SAR&H occasionally
found themselves in just this situation, of having
originated foreign policy actions and providing the
government a fait accompli. It may be a tribute to his
strong position in the government or his understanding of
the government's foreign policy objectives that he was able
to accomplish these actions and remain in position as
General Manager.
As a result of Vorster' s informality, other elements
beside the Prime Minister and Department of External Affairs
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were allowed into the foreign policy arena. The Parliament
was at best a debating forum on some subjects dealing with
foreign affairs. The opposition was looked upon as disloyal
and therefore not allowed an effective voice in policy
determination. Of course when the opposition is supportive
of the government's position, eg. Progressive Federal Party
(PFP) support of the Constellation of States as a
springboard of constructive foreign policy action, it
greatly reinforces the government's posture. The ruling
National Party, via its party discipline, tried to present a
united front though the need for secrecy in foreign
relations was frequently given as the reason to keep all
elements of the Parliament in the dark. A veil of secrecy
was a particularly favorite ploy of Foreign Minister Muller.
In 1974, at a time when African countries did not want to
acknowledge their relations with South Africa, Muller
claimed that "by preserving confidentiality ... one creates
confidence in the minds of those involved in the matter. One
would not like to shake their confidence and thwart the
progress that has been made." [Ref. 24: p. 50] The National
Party had a caucus and a study group within the caucus
,
ostensibly to inform the party policy makers on aspects of
policy. "Rather than initiators of policy these groups act
as forums for the government to announce and explain, to
sound out its followers and to mobilize support." [Ref. 24:
p. 67] They may also serve as a means to identify acceptable
88
limits to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.
[Ref. 24: pp. 59-67]
Some foreign policy and government analysts
attribute an influence, or possible source of influence, to
the Afrikaner Broederbond. SAR&H was one of the first
organizations dominated by Afrikaners, though direct
influence by the Broederbond is denied by officials of SATS.
A conspiratoral interpretation of the South African
government and foreign policy seeks explanation in the
organization of the Broederbond. And SATS, being an
Afrikaner dominated organization and a government supervised
body it is inferred that the Broederbond has members in SATS
and thus some degree of influence in this organization.
This suggestion produces vehement and lengthy denials from
SATS and government officials. Geldenhuys, by using writings
of Broederbond biographers and historians (Pelzer and
Serfontein) identifies instances in which the Broederbond
took part in government policy decisions, though often as
only a sounding board and support base. In line with the
Afrikaner Broederbond ' s business of "securing stable
political control for the Afrikaner" [Ref. 24: p. 173] the
Broederbond has committees studying various aspects of South
African government, society, political and foreign policy in
order that it may assist the Prime Minister.
In 1972 a new cabinet committee, the State Security
Council (SSC), was created by the Security Intelligence and
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State Security Council Act. It is designed to advise the
government on the "formulation and implementation of
national policy and strategy in relation to the security of
the Republic." [Ref. 24: p. 92] Due to its composition of
many cabinet ministers and co-opted civil servants and
technocrats when required, it can insure inputs in somewhat
more than the haphazard fashion referred to above. Though
the Cabinet remained the locus of foreign policy decision
making during the Vorster years, the SSC often provided the
cue to the Cabinet which did little more than ratify these
decisions [Ref. 24: p. 92]. During the Vorster years (until
1978) the locus of foreign policy decision making often
shifted between these organizations (SSC and Cabinet),
though the SSC tended to confine itself to strictly security
matters
.
Five officials are by law permanent members of the
SSC:
1. head of the National Intelligence Service,
2. head of the Police,
3. head of the SADF
,
4. Director General Foreign Affairs,
5. Director General Justice.
The SSC has a working committee of about eleven heads of
departments and the chairman of the working groups of the
other cabinet committees. Because of the vital link that
trade provides to an otherwise isolated South Africa the
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Minister of Industries, Commerce and Tourism as well as the
Minister of Transport and the SATS General Manager have a
standing co-optation to the SSC [Ref. 24: p. 100]and
[Ref. 38] It is at this point that the bureaucratic input
such as that by Loubser and the Minister of Transport is
provided. Thus through the SSC top civil servants have
become involved in foreign policy formulation. However,
unlike cabinet ministers and other politicians the civil
servant is not directly accountable to the Parliament and
electorate. For the General Manager of the SATS this is only
partly true, for he must answer to parliament each year via
the budgetary process.
P.W. Botha has strengthened the SSC and his position
as its head. He has created a team concept of government
composed of politicians and professionals to provide expert
input. This structure has produced criticism that decisive
leadership is now lost in committee [Ref. 24: p. 95]. The
implications of this decision making structure in foreign
policy include:
1. It may prevent ad hoc policy formulation in favor of
coordinated long term and inter-departmental
planning
.
2. It allows the SSC to make many final decisions in
foreign policy. In other instances it provides the
cue to the Cabinet for its decision concurrence.
3. It provides for checks and balances in the system.
4. It makes foreign policy formulation no longer the
preserve of a select few. [Ref. 24: p. 92]
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Since the inception of the SSC, Loubser has been a
frequent participant of the SSC meetings. This has been the
result of his personal high standing with Prime Minister
Vorster, his position as head of the largest commercial and
government organization in South Africa (SATS has a budget
and manpower roster larger than any department of the
government to include the SADF) and in the eyes of some
people in government the utility of the economic lever (ie.
transport) in formulating foreign policy towards states of
Southern Africa.
As mentioned previously, during the Vorster years
Loubser was sometimes concerned that he had too free a rein
in executing transport diplomacy. Following the Botha
government's election in 1978 Loubser was repeatedly called
upon to explain his actions before the Cabinet and the SSC
as a means of educating the Cabinet ministers. He was also
called upon and encouraged by the government to make more
public the advantages and positive results of his diplomatic
efforts. Such public and government awareness strengthened
the position of Loubser and transport diplomacy as an
instrument. Unfortunately, it also removed the secrecy
surrounding some inter-state actions which recipients of
South Africa's efforts may have found embarrassing to have
publicly revealed.
Development aid is another instrument of foreign
policy which is possibly debated by the SSC [Ref. 24: p.
92
131] and certainly involves the transport bureaucracy's
input. South Africa considers itself to be ideally equipped
to offer qualitative technological and economic aid to
Africa. This is based on the perception of the experience of
similar conditions to those faced by other African countries
[Ref. 25: p. 229]. In fact, however, most of South Africa's
aid is directed toward the homelands in an effort to make
them viable independent states. This aim of South Africa's
policy raises the unanswered question of why has transport
not been used more extensively to bring the homelands into
the regional sphere of economic activity. With the exception
of busses for labor commuting and marginal feeder roads to
the border industrial areas little in the way of
transportation has been diverted towards the homelands. This
is damning to the homelands given the key role transport
plays in the economic development and thus viability of the
homelands. SATS' input to the question of transport
development aid would be through the Minister of Transport
in the KEOSSA and the economic development branch of the
Foreign Ministry.
a. Hawks vs. Doves
Loubser had to champion his transport diplomacy
as a positive instrument of influence against arguments for
short term results and accusations of "aiding the enemy".
Though very much aware of the political mileage to be gained
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from working on neighboring countries' reliance of SAR&H,
Loubser consistently argued in favor of the longer term
benefits of an "open line" policy.
Such discussions have pitted Loubser and other
"doves" who supported the view that foreign country's close
economic ties with South Africa would act as an incentive to
their adopting a reasonable or moderate attitude towards the
Republic against the "hawks" who sought to promote state
security by the actual or threatened use of force. A major
source of disagreement with Loubser' s transport diplomacy
has been the military. This illustrates the existence of a
conflict between hawks and doves on ideas, tactics and
possibly strategy for regional relations. It will also
illustrate the nature of tranaport's role in bureaucratic
politics in the South African policy making elite.
For purposes of simplicity it is easy to
identify the military as "hawks" in foreign relations
matters and transport (Loubser) as "doves". Hawks believe
South Africa's main means of insuring security is the
development and use of military and economic muscle, and
believe these should be used in a coercive, punitive manner
to counter threats to South Africa. They worry that South
Africa may lose its ability to use these levers and thus
seeks to increase the economic dependency of South Africa's
neighbors. The hawk, therefore is supportive of the direct
manipulation of economic ties. Such actions include
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manipulation of exports to target states, restricting
traffic to and from the target state, altering tariff rates,
reducing migrant labor authorizations etc. The long term
consequences of these acts are either discounted or ignored.
Hawks are equally unconcerned about international
condemnations of South Africa. For them destabilization is a
desirable means to counter or pre-empt destabilizations
directed toward South Africa.
Doves acknowledge the utility of military and
economic strength but see the military as a "reserve force",
providing substance to any implied threat of
destabilization. Moreover, they see economic ties with
neighboring states as a key determinant of political
behavior. In their view, close economic links with South
Africa provide an incentive for a foreign country to adopt a
reasonable or moderate attitude towards the Republic.
[Ref. 24: pp. 144-146]
Herein lies the source of disagreement on the
use of transport in foreign relations. Transportation can be
used as either a 'stick' or a 'carrot'.
Particularly since the invasion of Angola in
1975 the military has become increasingly involved in the
government's decision making bureaucracy. 17 This was
17 The military's rise to greater influence and
importance in South African domestic and international
affairs is presently a popular topic and source of
explanation of the "aggressive" or "offensive" foreign
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formalized with the 1978 reorganization of the SSC, the
election of the former Defense Minister to Prime Minister
and the 1980 appointment of SADF Commander as Defense
Minister. The bureaucracy of the SSC secretariat is also
headed by a career military officer, General A.J. van
Deventer. By acting as a "gate-keeper" on the SSC's agenda
he can regulate to a certain extent the input to the council
[Ref. 24: p. 93]. This influence of the military either
through the attentive ear of the Prime Minister, the
committee system or informal social contacts, tends to
compound the sense of threat felt by many senior civil
servants who do not have the high technocratic and
management profile or do not enjoy the access to public
decision making afforded by Defence Force status [Ref. 41:
P. 147].
A counter to this argument of military influence
in the SSC is that input from other government institutions
has also been formalized in the new SSC, and that "...the
Council at least partly owes its present character to an
acknowledgement of the deficiencies and dangers involved in
the military's dominance of decision making on South
Africa's involvement in the Angolan War." [Ref. 24: p. 94]
This same institutionalized balance provides something of a
policy. See Frankel, P., Pretoria ' s Praetorians Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984. and Kolodziej , Edward and





Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1982.
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check to Loubser's concern that he was sometimes setting
foreign policy on his own and sought SSC acknowledgement, if
not approval and direction, to what he was already doing via
his transport diplomacy.
This thesis has stated that under Prime Minister
Vorster foreign policy formulation was centered in Vorster,
the Department of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Minister Muller)
the SSC and the Cabinet, possibly in that order. Frequently
such formulation was also done on an ad hoc basis utilizing
resident experts (bureaucrats and technocrats) regardless of
their formal participation in the Cabinet or SSC. Under
Botha the principles of foreign policy are largely
determined in the context of the SSC in which the Minister
of foreign Affairs is directly exposed to the military
influence [Ref. 41: p. 149]. According to Frankel, soldiers
at the top of the public policy making hierarchy give the
process a distinctive strategic coloration and tend to push
non-military political and economic variables of policy
making aside. Even in the diplomatic field the military's
presence has grown so that along with former generals as
ambassadors, Defence Force personnel are increasingly
prominent in negotiations and on diplomatic trips.
[Ref. 41: pp. 104-105]
If the military's presence is that pervasive and
influential (a matter not wholly agreed upon apart from the
quantitative facts) it would explain a sense of threat felt
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by many senior civil servants who have neither the high
technocratic profile nor the access to public decision
making afforded to the Defense Force. It would also explain
institutional tensions in the South African bureaucracy as
different organizations jockey for positions in the public
policy making process. [Ref. 41: pp. 147-148]
As operational foreign policy assets, the
military and the SAR&H/SATS jockey to be participants in
discussions regarding the utility of their facilities and
personnel in the external environment. By virtue of its
having a cabinet post and a permanent position on the SSC,
since 1972 the military has been in a structurally stronger
position to voice concerns on foreign policy matters than
the SAR&H. The military's obviously large voice in the
conduct of the war in Angola forced all other elements to
take the military into account. Furthermore, as outlined in
the 1977 Defense White Paper's exposition on a total
strategy, the military appear to relegate transportation to
a supporting role and would include it as a subordinate
element in a "comprehensive plan to utilize all the means
available to a state according to an integrated pattern in
order to achieve the national aims...." [Ref. 24: p. 140]
Through this manner of thinking, transportation, the largest
state structure and key to economic and political future of
the Southern African region, can be incorporated into the
military's view of countering the total onslaught, but
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apparently not as a separate entity. This line of reasoning
would lead one to believe that transportation's
participation in foreign policy formulation was limited and
subordinate to the military's concerns. This is not believed
to be the case, for the following reasons.
Organizationally, Loubser headed the largest organization in
South Africa and one of the most powerful in the region, and
could not be taken lightly. In addition, Loubser commanded a
great deal of personal respect in public service and
business circles, the result of his revitalization of SAR&H
and the successful record of his transport diplomacy.
Lastly, his own personally close relationship with the Prime
Minister guaranteed him an audience.
Throughout the Vorster years Loubser was able to
conduct transport diplomacy as he saw fit with very few
constraints or opposition. These efforts materialized in the
Victoria Falls talks of 1975, the efforts to re-open the
Rhodesia-Zambia border, and the continual cooperation with
an independent Mozambique. The Botha years have not been
marked by any serious deviations in the acceptance of
transport diplomacy but by far more discussion and the need
to sell transport diplomacy in and outside of the SSC. The
1981 withdrawal of locomotives from Zimbabwe is the major
exception to this rule. In what can be interpreted as a loss
for transport diplomacy, a business decision became
politicized by the South African government. Given that
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this occurred in the same time frame as SADF raids into
Angola and Mozambique it added great fuel to the
destabilization fire, and may in fact have been a deliberate
punitive reaction to Zimbabwe's calls for sanctions against
South Africa and an effort to alter Zimbabwe's talk of
providing ANC sanctuary. It may also be interpreted as a
indication of the military's ("hawks") success over
transport "doves". (For one to discern exactly the
military's position on this matter requires knowledge of the
SSC proceedings of that era, an impossibility given the
absolute secrecy of these proceedings is the norm. In light
of the recent election of the "communist" Mugabe and the
perception of this as a serious threat to South Africa it is
assumed that the military would have been supportive of an
effort to either weaken Mugabe's government or force it into
moderating its position towards South Africa and the ANC.
Loubser was definitely against using transport in this
fashion.
A clear victim of the militarization of foreign
policy in South Africa is the policy of regional economic
cooperation. This policy, in which local capital and
economic development planners have vested stakes, is
compromised by SADF strikes into neighboring states.
Economic instruments of foreign policy (such as
transportation) "gain in effectiveness by a patient buildup
of links and trusted relationships ... they can be swiftly
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undermined by threats and open or clandestine military
strikes into states with which, ostensibly, correct
relations are sought." [Ref. 42: p. 34]
This change in the structure and influence of
the military in the SSC preceded the change in General
Managers of SATS in 1983. Though a fine General Manager in
his own right, Grove is not able to compete with the
military influence in the SSC on regional policy matter to
the same degree as Loubser was able to for several reasons.
1. Grove does not have the same degree of personal
interest in transport diplomacy as Loubser.
Transport diplomacy was Loubser's 'baby', which he
nurtured and raised.
2. The current national economic crisis has confronted
the General Manager with very severe business
problems, forcing him to keep his transport services
running "according to business principles" and to
meet his other constitutional requirements. This
precludes any but minimal personal interest to the
foreign relations aspects of SATS activities.
3. Grove does not have the same personal high standing
within the government that Loubser enjoyed,
particularly in the latter half of his reign.
For these reasons it is doubtful that the transport bureauc-
racy will enjoy the same favorable stature that it had in
the late 1970 's and early 1980' s. On the other hand Grove
does have a good reputation as a successful manager and
businessman and in the current difficult economic times may
carry greater weight than previously.
Under the heading of the military and transport
lies the question of how the military incorporates SATS in
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their tactical or strategic plans. Unfortunately, at this
juncture this question shall have to go substantially
unanswered due to the secrecy surrounding such discussions.
As has been shown, transportation routes have been built
specifically for military purposes (eg. rail line to SWA in
1915; highways in northern SWA in the 1970' s, extension of
the Kazangula road in northern Botswana providing better
access by SADF to the Caprivi Strip area). [Ref. 43: pp.
40-43.] Publicly the SADF denies any plans to utilize the
SAR system in its strategic plans because the railroad is
"too hard to repair." [Ref. 44] This is a somewhat
surprising result given that the railways provide extensive
internal lines of communication and the ability to move
large volumes of materiel relatively inexpensively.
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III. TRANSPORTATION AS AN ELEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
This paper has shown that the governments of Southern
Africa have utilized their transport assets and
organizations as tools of their foreign policy since the
beginning of the colonial era. In an effort to better
understand and organize these past actions and provide the
beginnings of a theoretical framework regarding the use of
transport in foreign policy, this chapter will examine some
exampless of the positive, negative and neutral use of
transportation in foreign relations.
Though results are important for judging the effects of
policies, of principle interest here is the intent with
which a government acted when it utilized its transportation
assets as a foreign policy instrument. Given the inherent
difficulty of clearly identifying an individual's or group's
motivation compounded by the lack of memoirs from regional
leaders, intent has had to be surmised or hypothesized. The
analysis that follows is based on conversations with some of
the individuals involved, newspaper reports of the time,
academic articles and books.
18 For the sake of simplicity this discussion speaks of
only two nation situations, the actor nation and the target
nation, but it is recognized that in Southern Africa
transportation is an element that can be used by more than
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For a transport related action by the actor nation 1
8
to
effect the target nation, there must first be some sort of
transport connection between them. This may range from
bilateral trade to sharing a common border and transport
network to operating the transport system of the other
country. To have the desired effect, beyond harassment or
nuisance value, a minimum level of reliance by the target
nation on the actor nation must exist for that aspect of
transport which is to be used. What this level of reliance
is has not been quantified to my knowledge. 19 It may very
well be situationally dependent but would include the
following;
1. Psychological factors: national will, willingness to
make the requisite sacrifices; and influence of
popular will on national leadership.
2. Economic factors- level of trade between the two
nations ie. how much of the target nation's trade
(either volume, value or percentage of GNP ) is
conducted with or through the actor nation and vice
versa. Other economic factors or relationships that
help determine a country's level of reliance include;
the value or volume of transit trade; the ratio of
external trade to GNP; the proportion of transit
trade to total trade; the amount or level of benefits
that the transit nation derives from the trade
traffic of the target state; general overall economic
health of the target nation.
one nation against another. The border closure by Zambia
against Rhodesia later followed by Mozambique closing its
border with Rhodesia is an example.
19 See Appendix One for discussion of the concept of
interdependence, vulnerability and sensitivity.
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3. Geographical factors- availability of alternatives
for the target nation and their efficiency.
4. Political factors- expectations of external support
(eg. can the actor or target nation reasonably expect
economic support to reduce the costs it incurs).
Each of these factors is analytically distinct but closely
integrated in practice.
Transportation can be used as a positive influence from
one nation to another. "Positive influence" is used here to
mean a tactic for improving or warming relations between
nations or improving the actor nation's international image.
In Southern Africa actions with this intent include:
economic aid, disaster relief assistance, area economic
development and technical and managerial assistance and
particularly an improvement of the efficiency or economy of
the country's transport network. It also includes the less
tangible actions of diplomacy involving organizational and
personal ties and the commonality of interest that go along
with them. The philosophy behind transportation working as
a positive influence rests on the idea that aid to fellow
nations will reduce personal and national ill will, creation
of areas of common interest will increase the cost of
disrupting those interests and personal and organizational
communication will replace, supplant or initiate
inter-governmental communication. To be able to positively




1. The actor nation/ transport organization needs to have
the assets, facilities and capability to carryout the
proposed aid or assistance.
2. Individuals and organization must be willing to put
aside political and cultural differences in order to
lessen or neutralize their adverse effects.
Transportation can also be used as a negative or
punitive foreign policy instrument. This means that
transportation can be used by the actor nation to change the
target nation's behavior by imposing or threatening to
impose costs of various sorts on the target nation as
punishment for past actions or to prevent their recurrence.
This can take the form of, discriminatory freight rates,
denial of access to facilities such as landing rights or
border closings, embargoes on the haulage of specific
commodities, and physical destruction or disruption of the
target nation's transport facilities. An indirectly negative
use of transport is the search by the actor nation for
alternative trade routes so as to avoid use of the target
nation's facilities. This is also done as a means of
developing new areas or as a means by which a nation better
postures its options with no overt intention for foreign
policy implications. To be able to negatively influence
another country, a nation must meet the following criteria:
1. It must have have a dominant position in relation to
the target country over that aspect of transportation
it intends to use; ie. if border closure is the
tactic, then for it to have an effect the target
nation cannot have an alternative outlet that can
absorb the diverted traffic.
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2. The opportunity costs for the target nation must be
greater than the opportunity costs for the actor.
These include but are not limited to financial costs
of lost revenues or the additional costs of
alternative routing of traffic.
3. The actor nation must be prepared to neutralize or
overcome efforts of the target nation to counter
pressure; such efforts would include diplomatic and
legal action under terms of UN treaties and
conventions guaranteeing the right of transit to
landlocked nations, 20 potential military threat.
A cost most frequently ignored or discounted is the legality
of the act under international law or the effect imposition
of the action will have on the actor's international
standing
.
Neutral actions are those undertaken with no specific
foreign policy concern in mind such as the creation of new
rail lines or air routes based wholly on narrowly defined
economic considerations. Along this line of thinking,
transportation can also be found to be a victim rather than
an instrument of foreign policy. Unlike the situation in
which transport facilities are purposely destroyed, regional
tensions may result in a deterioration or overuse of a
transport network the result being its debilitation.
Depending on one's point of view this may have a positive or
negative effect and may even be the basis for accusations of
using transport as an instrument of policy.
20 The 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked
States in UN Treaty Series
,
vol 579 no 8641.
107
A. EXAMPLES OF EFFORTS AT POSITIVE INFLUENCE
The most notable example of the use of transport
diplomacy as a tool of positive influence in foreign policy
is the practice of transport diplomacy by Loubser and the
SAR&H/SATS during the period 1970-1985. Due to the nature
of this strategy (ie. its emphasis on protracted
inter-personal relations, building trust and common
interests) it is not appropriate to identify only one act
but rather a series of actions to exemplify transport
diplomacy. As an example of transport diplomacy in action
one may look at SAR&H-Mozambican Railways (CFM) relations
from 1975 to the present.
1. South African-Mozambican Transport Assistance
1975-1985
a. Background
As one may recall from Chapter 1, transport
development in the Transvaal region and Mozambique have
always been closely related, the former providing the reason
and wherewithal, the latter the port of Lourenco Marques
(now Maputo). This symbiotic relationship continued until
Mozambican independence at which point the Republic of South
Africa had to decide whether it would work with a Marxist
government and Mozambique had to decide whether it could
afford to disengage itself from the white majority
governments (Rhodesia and South Africa).
108
b. Action
Transport diplomacy with Mozambique began even
before the independence celebration via close coordination
between the two transport services. Despite a lack of
diplomatic relations between governments, Loubser was
invited to attend the independence celebration. At this
point he made a personal judgement that proper relations
could be maintained with the Mozambican railways (CFM)
despite hostile rhetoric from the Mozambican government.
Business relations between the two organizations continued
after independence, though traffic fell off as a result of
harbor inefficiency and poor maintenance of the railroad. As
the lack of skilled manpower became more crucial in
Mozambique the National Director of the Mozambique Ports and
Railways (DNPCF) , Mr. Alcantara Santos, began to work
closely with Loubser to organize assistance from the SAR&H.
This took the following forms:
1. Repair and rebuilding of locomotives shortly after
independence as well as more recently (September
1984). Repair of rail lines damaged in Mozambican
civil war. eg. January 1985.
2. Managerial training of CFM staff. Training of
Mozambican railwaymen in all levels and manner of
transport operations has also taken place. This has
even been taken to the extreme of operating the port
of Maputo.
3. Talks held in March 1977 on ways to improve traffic
to Maputo and ways for SAR to encourage South African
business to utilize the port of Maputo. The
SAR&H-CFM 1979 business agreement signed 26 February
1979 provided for the continuation of healthy
business practices between neighboring states and the
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ties of friendship which flow from them. This
agreement also required South Africa to keep the
tariff rate from Johannesburg to Maputo below that of
Johannesburg to Durban.
4. Assistance in expanding the capacity of the rail line
from Maputo to South Africa at Komatipoort, this has
included the installation of a Centralized Traffic
Control system on the Komatipoort-Maputo line. South
Africa has provided materials for the above projects.
5. Cooperation with Mozambique's objective of not
trading with Rhodesia by insuring that Rhodesian
exports go through South African ports.
6. Attendance by both parties at periodic conferences of
engineers
.
7. The September 1984 accord arranged between the
Minister of Transport of South Africa and the
Director General of Mozambican Railways for the
repair of six locomotives.
8. SAR representatives have acted on behalf of the
government on courier and representative capacities.
c. Objectives
1. South Africa wanted to maintain business relations
with Mozambique.
2. South Africa wanted to maintain access to the Port of
Maputo
.
3. South Africa wanted to moderate the government's
anti-apartheid stance via friendly business
relations
4. South Africa sought to pave the way for government to
government communication.
5. Mozambique sought to maintain in operation the
transport network as a means of furthering
development and earning foreign exchange.
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d. Results
The business objectives have all been clearly
met in that relations have remained open and continuous even
during periods of hostility between the two countries such
as followed a January 1981 SADF attack on an ANC
headquarters in Matola, a port city next to Maputo. Despite
this action the General Managers of the two national
transport services spoke to one another the very next
morning seeking reassurance of non- involvement and a
continued relationship. Presently business relations are
maintained on a daily basis via SATS representatives in
Maputo and CFM representatives in Johannesburg. However,
traffic flows have steadily fallen over the past ten years.
In part this is due to the fact that the efficiency of the
port of Maputo and the rail lines servicing it have not
always been up to the standard that South African
businessmen prefer.
Whether the open relations of the transport
organizations have paved the way for closer government
relations is clearly debatable. The CFM insists on all
relations being business like and between transport
services, not inter-governmental. In light of the hostility
mentioned above ("it was a state of war" according to one
SATS official), South Africa's support of the Mozambique
National Resistance (MNR) and Mozambique's efforts to
111
distance itself from South Africa one cannot easily claim a
warming of diplomatic relations between the two governments.
This perception has changed somewhat since the Nkomati
Accord of March 1984. SATS personnel had a very modest
diplomatic role in bringing about this accord. At the same
time transport diplomacy has not contributed to a worsening
of relations. Mozambique transport officials are content, if
not pleased, with the state of relations with SATS, though
they feel that South African businessmen should provide
financing to renovate the port that they use.
Consequently, transport diplomacy receives good
marks on business grounds but does not appear to have met
its political goals.
2 . South African Assistance to Zambia 1975-Present
a. Background
Prior to Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI), Zambia conducted its trade principally
through Rhodesia to the Mozambican and Southern African
ports. Some copper exports did pass over the Benguela line
to Lobito, Angola. Following UDI Zambia tried assiduously to
cut its reliance on Rhodesian Railways. This was successful
only to a limited degree. In 1973 Rhodesia removed the
option of traffic from Zambia by closing the Rhodesia-Zambia
border. Even when Rhodesia offered to allow some
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commodities through, Zambia felt this an opportune time to
sever ties with the White south. Within two to three years
it was clear that Zambia's alternative routes were not
meeting her needs.
b. The Action
The first efforts by SAR&H at diplomacy with
Zambia Railways during the post 1973 period were an integral
part of the Kaunda-Vorster detente initiative of 1974-75 and
were based on Loubser 's long time friendship with the
General Manager of Zambian Railways, Mr. Mazurka. SAR&H
played a key role in organizing and supporting the Victoria
Falls talks in August 1975. During these talks, in private
conversation with President Kaunda, Loubser and Prime
Minister Vorster tried unsuccessfully to get Kaunda to
reopen the border and relieve himself of a growing economic
calamity. Prime Minister Smith of Rhodesia was even





The second effort at transport diplomacy toward
Zambia began in 1978 at which time Zambia's alternative
routes had substantially failed her and the economic
troubles and food shortages were becoming the source of
21 See Geldenhuys book
,
"The Diplomacy of Isolation",
pages 271-271, for a transcript of the conversation. The
contents of which were confirmed in private conversation
with Dr. Loubser.
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domestic discontent and unrest. The open lines of
communication that had been maintained through the years by
Loubser and his Zainbian counterpart now paid their
dividends. The request for assistance was made by telephone
from Zambia to South Africa and immediately followed up with
a meeting between the General Managers to identify specific
needs and means of assistance. Within hours ships carrying
maize for Zambia were diverted to South African ports and
the required food and fertilizer were moving north to
Zambia. Soon copper began moving south for export. South
Africa also loaned Zambia four locomotives and some wagons
to speed up the movement
.
c. South African Objectives
In the first case;
1. South Africa was seeking detente, a rapproachment
with the frontline states. Trade relations were
believed to be one way of building that
rapproachment
.
2. Initiation of traffic/ trade through Rhodesia was seen
as another way of increasing influence over Rhodesia
to moderate its position toward a settlement.
Rhodesia's 1973 border closure was executed without
consulting South Africa who very strongly opposed it.
3. South Africa sought an increase in railway revenues.
4. South Africa sought an improvement of international
and regional image by providing humanitarian
assistance to Zambia.
In the second case;
1. South Africa's objective was to answer a request for
humanitarian aid and thus improve the image of South
Africa by aiding a nation in need.
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2. South Africa hoped to build better relations with the
frontline states.
3. South Africa wanted to increase revenues to the SAR&H
and traffic to the South African ports which were
suffering a slowdown in traffic.
In regards to Zambian objectives, Zambia resorted to this
out of necessity to get fertilizer for planting, food for
eating, and reliable ports for copper exports in order to
comply with IMF requirements for increased production.
d. Results
1. In the first case, given that Zambia did not accept
the South African proposal to begin trade through
Rhodesia this example of transport diplomacy did not
achieve any of it objectives save for reminding
Kaunda of South Africa's willingness to provide
assistance
.
2. In the second case, Zambia got the needed fertilizer
and food and copper exports began to travel to South
African ports within three weeks
.
3. This action allowed South Africa to show the world
its efficiency and ability to work with Black African
states. South African Railways assisted Zambian
Railways with the loan of four locomotives. Air
traffic between the two countries was re-started in
August 1979.
4. SAR&H received a boost to its revenues and the
increased traffic helped revitalize the port of East
London.
5. Zambian acceptance of South African assistance caused
a crisis in relations between Zambia and Tanzania,
and other frontline states. Tanzania stood to lose a
good deal of traffic and its associated revenue, many
of these states also interpreted Zambia's actions as
selling out to the White south.
6. The SAR&H was hailed in South African press as
honorary diplomats. This action added support to the
idea of the importance of economic ties for the
constellation of states, and enhanced Loubser's
position in the government.
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7. A long term effect is that traffic from Zambia has
not stopped flowing since 1978, and, having seen
Zambian success, in 1979 Zaire began to divert some
of its exports to South African ports.
8. Via the resultant continuous communications,
difficulties in the business of trade, such as
backlogs in traffic or non-compliance of agreements,
have been easily resolved within the transport
organizations
.
9. This action demonstrated the weight of economic
necessity versus political desire.
B. EXAMPLES OF NEGATIVE TRANSPORT ACTIONS
1. Zambia- Rhodesia Railway Crisis of 1966
a. Background
The first foreign policy directed shots fired
using the weapon of transport between Zambia and Rhodesia
occurred shortly after UDI as a result of Zambia's efforts
to implement financial sanctions against Rhodesia. As a left
over from the days of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, the Rhodesia Railways was still jointly owned by
both countries. The majority of maintenance facilities and
the administrative offices were located in Rhodesia. At
Broken Hill, Zambia was located another accounting center
for the collection of freight charges on Zambian imports and
copper exports. Due to the rate structure of the railroad,
this amounted to the great majority of all railway revenues.
Because she controlled these transport revenues, Zambia




Through exchange controls in 1965 Zambia had
begun to restrict money flow to Rhodesia as part of the
British sponsored sanctions towards Rhodesia. Suddenly in
April 1966 Zambia cut-off all payments from the railway's
accounts to Rhodesia.
c. Objectives
The intent of this major foreign policy
initiative which jeopardized the transport of ninety percent
of Zambian exports and thus her developmental program was;
1. To pressure Rhodesia by depriving her of one million
Pounds sterling per month in revenues
.
2. To pressure the British economy and thus the
government into doing more towards Rhodesia by
denying Britain 40% of her copper imports
Having no alternative means of expeditiously
exporting her copper and still feeling bound to Rhodesian
Railways by tradition and contract, Zambia was in a
decidedly weaker position than Rhodesia. In May 1966
Rhodesia put into effect the requirement that all freight
charges for traffic into Zambia via Rhodesia Railways had to
be paid in advance to Bulawayo and similarly for Zambian
exports. Copper exports were immediately affected because
the Zambian government would not allow the copper companies
to make the payments. Likewise, Zambian imports were held up
in Mozambique, South Africa and Rhodesia. Within two weeks
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the Zambian government relented and allowed payment of rail
freight for goods contracted prior to the Rhodesian action
and later all "essential supplies". A month later Zambia
allowed copper export shipments to be carried by Rhodesia
Railways. After another year of protracted negotiations




The crisis of May-July 1966 failed in its
immediate goal of pressuring Rhodesia into a settlement fo
UDI , but it did effectively cancel the international
agreements that obligated governmental and business
organizations in Zambia to patronize Rhodesia Railways at
the expense of other routes [Ref. 45: p. 156]. This opened
the door for Zambia to utilize the Benguela line to Lobito,
Angola and seek alternative routes through politically
acceptable neighbors. Discussions to this effect were begun
in 1966 and agreement reached to ship 40,000 metric tons per
month (two- thirds of Zambian production) through Zaire.
Though these quantities were never fully realized these
talks were a diplomatic triumph for Zambia in its efforts to
disengage itself from transport dependency on the white
ruled south.
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2 . Rhodesia- Zambia Border Closure
a. Background
The six and a half years following the May 1966
railway crisis did not bring Zambia and Rhodesia closer but
further apart and in the transport arena were marked by
Rhodesian demands for a guaranteed percentage of traffic and
increased freight rates and road taxes. Zambia's support
for Joshua Nkomo ' s guerillas eventually was deemed
intolerable by Rhodesia. This unwillingness to tolerate
Zambian protection of the guerilla units climaxed in early
1973. Meanwhile Zambia's available alternatives for
transport had changed considerably as shown in Tables IX,
XI, X, XIII and XIV below. 22
As shown in the tables below (Table V, XI, XII
and XIII) Rhodesia had reason to believe that it had a
dominant, if not controlling position over Zambian trade.
b. The Action
On 9 January 1973, without previously consulting
South Africa or Portugal (Mozambique), Prime Minister Ian
Smith of Rhodesia announced the closing of the border
between Rhodesia and Zambia as a reprisal for actions in
22 For a most complete analysis fo Zambian transportation
before and after UDI see: Eugene Harrison. "Reorientation of
Transportation Patterns from Zambia after the Rhodesian
UDI." Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1972.
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TABLE V
Zambian Imports from Rhodesia
in Pre-devaluation British Pounds
Rhodesian











































Source: [Ref. 46: p. 602] [Ref. 47]
Rhodesia by nationalist guerillas believed to be operating
from Zambia. Within a day he announced that this closure did
not apply to the export of copper [Ref. 43: p. 78].
However, it was too late to retrieve the lost traffic of
this high freight rate commodity, for Zambia seized this
opportunity to cut all transport ties with the white
minority regime.
c. Objectives
Rhodesia's principle objective in closing the
border was to receive some assurance from Zambia that
Rhodesian guerillas would no longer operate from Zambia.
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[Ref. 48] Rhodesia sought also to eat its cake by recanting
a portion of its' border closure and allowing the copper
exports to transit Rhodesia.
d. Results
1. Zambia countered Rhodesia's closure and recantation
by not allowing copper traffic to transit Rhodesia
because "Rhodesia would not return the empty railway
wagons, which normally carry imports." [Ref. 45: p.
163]
2. Rhodesia lost approximately (Rhodesian) $1 Million
per month in lost revenue. This rose to R$21 Million
in 1975 with the loss of more transit traffic from
Mozambique and South Africa [Ref. 23: p. 2].
E.G.Cross maintains that this border closure had
little effect on the Rhodesian economy since
manufactures were able to establish alternative
outlets for their production. [Ref. 49: p. 25]
3. This action put Zambia and South Africa on the same
side of the Rhodesian issue and helped pave the way
for detente in the next year.
4. Zambia was forced to rely on other routes and expand
their capacity by up to 75,000 tons per month to
bring in general goods, coke and spare parts and
machinery for the mines . This was done by greater
utilization of the Benguela railroad and the Great
North Road to Dar Es Salaam and later the TANZAM
railway
.
5. Zambia was forced cut to back on non-essential
imports inadvertently improving her balance of
payment situation.
6. Tanzania had to alter her transport patterns and
provide essentially the entire port of Dar Es Salaam
to Zambia. This was to the detriment of Tanzania,
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.
7. Zambia won international sympathy for her plight and
received increases of U.N. and bilateral aid.
8. This action was a "watershed in South African
politics" [Ref. 50: p. 287] resulting in a loss of













sealed the doom of South Africa's hope to re-orient
Zambia's foreign policy and trade towards South
Africa before the completion of the TANZAM railroad.
[Ref. 27: p. 79]
For Rhodesia this action did not achieve any of its
intended objectives but did backfire on Rhodesia to a
notable degree. Rhodesia appears to have "failed both
to take into account the change in Zambia's trading
patterns since 1965, and to give due weight to
Zambia's readiness to sustain short term costs to
maintain her political independence from the white
south." [Ref. 27: p. 79] From Zambia's point of
view, her counter measure was successful only to the
degree that it enabled her to feel good about no
longer using the Rhodesia Railway. Because, within
all too short a time Zambia again needed to find
cheap and reliable transit routes and sources of
supply to satisfy the demands of her new consumers.
An example of this problem of reliability and
efficiency is shown by the following table detailing
the availability of locomotives on what was to be
Zambia's main export route, the TAZARA railway to Dar
Es Salaam, Tanzania. This low motive power
availability caused very long turn-around times for
rolling stock; 11.4 days in 1976/77 and 26.1 days in
1981/82. [Ref. 51: p. 13]
TABLE VI
Total Number of Locomotives and Availability
76/77 77/78 78/79 80/81 82/83 83/84
51 52 39 23 2-9 33
85 85 85 97 83 94
60% 617o 467o 24% 357o 35%
[Ref. 51: p. 13]
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The true costs involved in choosing to use
alternative routes can be better appreciated by reviewing
the estimated cost of shipping a ton of copper along each
route as shown below in Table VII.
TABLE VII
Estimated Cost per Ton to Ship Zambian Copper to







Rail to Beira or L-M and ship to Europe
Rail to Lobito and Ship to Europe
Highway to Dar Es Salaam and ship
C-131 aircraft to Europe (full load return)
C-131 acft to Europe (only 60% load return)
Sources: Stanford Research Institute, Middle Africa
Transportation Survey
,
in [Ref. 1: p. 470].
In theoretical terms then, Rhodesia failed to
accurately assess Zambia's vulnerability to a border
closure, and did not accurately weigh her own opportunity
costs. The loss in revenues from Zambian copper and transit
traffic from Mozambique and South Africa only increased
Rhodesia's economic troubles.
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3 . Mozambique -Rhodesia Border Closing 1976
a. Background
Mozambique's first hint of border closure came
in October 1975 in a UN address in which its representative
stated that "FRELIMO and the People's Republic of Mozambique
are ready to assume all responsibilities in conformity with
their international duty." [Ref. 52: p. 85] Mozambique
coordinated its policy towards Rhodesia with the other
Frontline states. At a meeting at Quelimane, Mozambique in
February 1976, Presidents Machel, Kaunda, Nyerere and
Seretse Khama agreed to a common policy to support the
guerillas. The "four frontline presidents also agreed that
the Mozambican government should apply UN sanctions against
Rhodesia and close the Mozambique-Rhodesia border."
[Ref. 52: p. 85] For years prior to this time Rhodesia had
been conducting across the border military operations in
Mozambique. Following such an incident of 'hot pursuit' by
Rhodesia in March 1976 President Machel announced the
closing of the border and the seizure of Rhodesian property
in Mozambique. Mozambique was confident that it would
receive international aid to compensate it for at least some
of its losses. It was also confident of the effectiveness
of this action for by the mid-1790's a majority of Rhodesian
external trade was moving by rail through Mozambique, 75% in
1972. [Ref. 53: p. 45]
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b. Objectives
A principal objective of Mozambique's was to
show support for the liberation struggle in accordance with
UN and OAU decisions. They also sought to apply greater
pressure on the Rhodesian government, in combination with
support for the guerilla offensive in early 1976, to end UDI
by entering serious negotiations on the transfer of power to
a black government.
c. Results
1. This action closed the border, adding strength to UN
sanctions
.
2. All Rhodesian rail traffic now would have to use the
SAR. Formerly, almost 80% of Rhodesian traffic had
travelled directly to Lourenco-Marques
.
3. This action put South Africa firmly in charge of
Rhodesian trade.
4. This in turn made Rhodesia more susceptible to an
attack on trade.
5. Mozambique lost $57-$74 million per year in railroad
and port revenues and $89-115.5 million through other
effected losses. Approximately 16,000 Mozambican jobs
were also lost as a result of this action. [Ref. 52:
p. 87]
6. Rhodesia lost one sixth of its railway rolling stock
(2300 wagons) worth approximately $46 million. Most
of these were returned after Zimbabwean independence.
7. Rhodesian raids on guerillas operating from
Mozambique were increased.
8. The expected international aid for Mozambique did not
materialize as quickly or in the amount expected, and
when some of it did come it was in the form of loans
which simply added to Mozambique's debt problem.
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9. Ultimately, the effect on Mozambique was that it






With the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland in 1963 Southern Rhodesia was able to pursue trade
policies independent of its former partners. South African
trade immediately began to increase due to the lessening or
removal of tariff barriers. Following his election on a
platform of Rhodesian independence, Ian Smith sought closer
relations with South Africa. This was necessary due to the
independence of Malawi and Zambia and the consequent
realignment of powers in the region. Smith also sought South
African reaction, hopefully support, for Rhodesian
independence
.
The signing of a South Africa-Rhodesia trade
agreement in 1965 was interpreted by Smith as support for
Rhodesian independence and on November 11, 1965 Rhodesia
announced a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI).
South Africa wanted more trade and not an international
crisis
.
UDI held many disadvantages for South Africa:
1. It was a setback in its effort to create an
acceptable international image.
2. South Africa did not want to be seen as the champion
of White states , but South African White popular
opinion demanded support for Rhodesia.
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3. Above all it created an atmosphere of tension,
uncertainty and instability that the South African
government had hoped to avoid. In an effort to
remain free of identification with the Smith
government, South Africa refused to give it formal
recognition. To preclude giving support to the
concept of economic sanctions which had been
suggested as a counter to South African apartheid
policies, South Africa stood on the principle of
non-interference in the internal affairs of another
state
.
South Africa sought an end to the Rhodesian issue
for the following reasons:
1. It placed outward movement in jeopardy.
2. It hurt the general South African image by having her
identified as sustaining an illegal regime's economy
and military.
3. Continued conflict might escalate to include foreign
powers (eg. Cuba, Soviet Union). Or conflict may
radicalize (create Marxists) the Blacks in Rhodesia
and may spill-over into the Black South African
population.
The Mozambican border closure in early 1976 put
South Africa in the position of being able to control the
economic and strategic life of the Rhodesian government.
This is because South Africa now totally controlled
Rhodesia's trade outlets. A world wide recession, inflation
and overcrowding on the SAR also aided in applying pressure
on Rhodesia by restricting Rhodesia's exports, imports and






Pretoria was shocked at the unexpected victory
of Robert Mugabe in the independence elections of
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Pretoria was concerned that the lesson
learned by Blacks in South Africa would be that violence and
military struggle is the way to independence and that
moderates cannot win. Pretoria also saw an end to its
constellation of states idea when Mugabe joined the SADCC
.
Given Zimbabwe's economic and geographic pivotal position in
Southern Africa it has the ability to strongly undercut
South Africa's position in the region, though Mugabe
professed a desire to continue economic relations with his
southern neighbor. Pretoria adopted an ambivalent and then
hostile attitude toward Zimbabwe.. In the field of
transportation this began with threats of curtailing maize
imports if railway trucks were not returned to South Africa.
The hostile acts progressed to include the recall of SAR
technicians, railcars and later, short term embargoes on
traffic to Zimbabwe due to a backlog of goods awaiting
shipment in South African ports.
These were credible threats given that the rail
line to Beira only opened in February 1980 and the line to
Maputo in October 1980. The pipeline to Beira was not
operating until much later due to prolonged discussions
between the nations over tariffs on oil. By March 1981 only
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18% of Zimbabwe's imports and exports were flowing through
Mozambique.
b. The Actions
The key action in this case was the withdrawal
of locomotives that were on hire to Zimbabwe at the end of
their contract in April 1981. Secondly, South Africa was
accused of holding up import shipments, particularly oil, to
Zimbabwe. This was done by insisting that full payment be
received for one shipment before another one is made.
[Ref. 54: p. 8] The political nature of some of these
actions was clouded by the possibility of tangible economic
necessity on the part of South Africa, such as an extra
large grain harvest in 1981, and a reasonable need to alter
the terms of the Preferential Trade Agreement, and providing
14 steam locomotives to Zimbabwe for shunting before all of
the diesel locomotives were withdrawn.
c. Objectives
South Africa's objectives were;
1. To show that Black rule does not work.
2. To illicit cooperation from Zimbabwe.
3. To secure commitment from Zimbabwe to limit ANC
presence
.
4. To make Zimbabwe pay for her commitment to South
African liberation movements and for her verbal
attacks on South Africa.
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To stifle any economic union of Black states that may
promote Zimbabwe as a center and not South Africa.
d. Results
1. By September 1981 demand for transport in Zimbabwe
was critical. Oil reserves fell to a three day supply
and Zimbabwe had to turn away orders for the export
of her maize. Zimbabwe lost about Z$7 million per
week in export earnings
.
2. Zimbabwe continued to alter transport routes
especially through Maputo and by the end of 1981
almost 40% of general trade was passing through
Mozambique
.
3. The rehabilitation of the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline
(easily capable of handling most of Zimbabwe's
petroleum requirements) was speeded up though never
put into operation because Mozambique and Zimbabwe
could not agree on the tariff.
4. Zimbabwe purchased more diesel engines from the U.S.
and Canada and received management help from India.
5. Finally, in early 1982 Zimbabwe toned down its
anti-South Africa rhetoric and initiated talks to
reopen trade and transportation negotiations. South
Africa conceded to renew the loan of locomotives,
move fuel deliveries more expeditiously and abandoned
the requirement for ministerial talks on railroad
negotiations and the Preferential Trade Agreement
.
6. This case also exhibits the ease with which routine
business matters can be elevated to the level of
political crisis by the actor nation.
This action was essentially effective because
South Africa dominated Zimbabwe's external trade routes, the
Mozambican ports and railroads still being relatively new
and suffering from a four year lack of use and a worsening
national economy that could not afford the required
maintenance. Continued civil war activity within the
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country, some of which is believed to have been directed by
South Africa, also destroyed transport and communication
facilities. Restricting the use of locomotives was
particularly harmful due to Zimbabwe's rapidly expanding
foreign trade at this time. Also of note is the fact that
though the Beira route was open and only half as far as the
South African ports, due to its steep gradient (1:40) it
required two locomotives to haul the same load as to other
outlets. [Ref. 53: p. 45]
6 . Others
As mentioned earlier often times transport itself
can be the target as well as the means of creating negative
influence on another nation. By this is meant the actual
destruction or disabling of a country's transport network.
In the guerilla wars of Southern Africa this principally
takes the form of mining or destroying key rail and road
ways or bridges. This has been, and is being, done by both
guerilla groups and national military forces. Its
effectiveness varies with the degree of damage done, the
importance of the line destroyed and most importantly, the
ability of the target country to repair the damage or
re-route traffic. See Table VIII below.
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TABLE VIII
Actions of Negative Influence
DATE ACTION
Easter 76 Mined rail line
vicinity Beit Bridge





27 Oct 78 27 SAR wagons
damaged on Zambia RR
30 Oct 78 Landmine destroyed
locomotive and track
35k from Lusaka
Early 79 Road, rail bridge
destroyed; Moatize,
Mozambique
22 Sep 83 Angolan goods train
70km from Lubango
in SW Angola































C. EXAMPLES OF THE NEUTRAL INFLUENCE OF TRANSPORT
1. Zambian Alternative Routing ( See Table IX )
a. Background
Northern Rhodesia has had a historical
dependence on its southern neighbors to move its exports to
port. Despite the availability of the Benguela railroad and
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routings through Zaire, Northern Rhodesia, later Zambia, was
linked to Rhodesia Railways by contracts for a minimum
percentage of her export traffic. The advent of independence
provided an opportunity for new voices to be heard, and
independent Zambia sought disengagement from the White
south. Concomitantly, Zambia sought greater regional
integration foreseeing for herself a central position in
such an arrangement. UDI and the UN's call for sanctions
against Rhodesia hastened Zambia's disengagement process.
Disengagement from a White south required either
changing the White majority governments or finding
alternative routes for trade. Zambia supported the former
and, regardless of the nature of Rhodesian and South African
governments, realized that it would be in her interest to
pursue the latter. Kaunda sought to provide access to the
ocean through politically sympathetic nations which are not
hostile to the fundamental principles on which he bases the
policies of Zambia. President Kaunda revived interest in
the idea of a rail route to Dar Es Salaam and following the
1966 rail crisis renegotiated contracts with Zaire.
b. The Actions
The actions that Zambia pursued include:
1. Truck transport over the Great North Road to Dar Es
Salaam. This was a 1200 mile dirt road (bitumenized
by 1972) noted for poor traf ficability in wet
weather. It could handle 15,000 metric .tons of
traffic per month.
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2. The Benguela railroad to Lobito, Angola. This route
could carry 15,000 metric tons per month except when
destroyed by guerillas in Angola or Zaire in 1968-69.
and from 1977 to the present.
3. Truck transport on the Great East Road to Malawi and
then by rail to Beira. This route takes four times as
long as by road to Dar Es Salaam and is 20% more
expensive. It could handle 4,000 metric tons per
month.
4. Air transport to Dar Es Salaam or via rail and barge
to Mombasa and other ports. These alternatives were
used sparingly and never taken seriously as long term
alternatives due to their exorbitant cost.
c. Objectives
The primary objective was to reduce economic
ties to White Southern Africa by reducing trade and
infrastructural linkages. This was principally directed at
Rhodesia in accordance with the UN economic sanctions. A
secondary objective, though in long run perhaps more
important, was the creation of new routes as a means of
diversifying the nation's alternatives and thus reducing a
country's reliance on any one route.
d. Effects
Due to monthly copper production of 60,000
metric tons and the low capacity of alternative routes,
Rhodesia Railways were still able to carry 20,000 metric
tons per month until the 1973 border closure. In the early
1970 's they were able to demand a minimum level of traffic
from Zambia or force a 50% surcharge on Zambian imports.
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[Ref. 45: pp. 160-162] Consequently, until the option was
removed, Zambia's efforts to utilize alternative trade
routes were unsuccessful, not due to a lack of effort or
resolve but but because of the lack of development of
sufficient alternative routes and the instability of other
regimes. Ironically, as Zambia reduced her trade with
Rhodesia her imports from South Africa increased, doubling
between 1964-1974. This was a direct result of the loss of
her principal trading partner and a growing demand for
capital and consumer goods
.
D. A CONSTELLATION OF TRANSPORT ORGANIZATIONS?
Though the South African government's Constellation of
States, as applies to Southern Africa as a whole, has not
come achieved its designers' expectations, a constellation
of transportation organizations is alive and well and
continuing to flourish. This section is not intended to be
an argument for regional co-operation but is designed to
present a possible framework by which one may better
understand or view the inter-relationship of transport
organizations in Southern Africa and the role transport
diplomacy plays in keeping them together. Rather than
"constellation", the term "association" will be used to
label the idea of a regional transportation grouping, and to
avoid the negative connotation that "constellation" may have
picked up in the Southern African context.
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Though some transport organizations in Southern Africa
are joined in formal organizations (eg. Inter-state
Transport Liaison Committee of South Africa's Constellation
of States, the South Africa Custom Union and SADCC '
s
Southern Africa Transport and Communications Committee) most
are linked by shared rail lines and business agreements
regulating the cost and use of one another's rail lines,
equipment and facilities. They all are unified in a
professional sense of purpose of moving freight and
passengers as efficiently and economically as possible.
The basis for identifying a regional transportation
network extends to the early days of the railroads when they
first crossed colonial or international borders. As has been
elaborated on in the first chapter of this paper, the early
years were marked by intense competition between railroads
and their governments. Later, cooperation became the byword
as the rail lines divided traffic among themselves and
worked together throughout the 20th century. Independence in
the 1960 's was accompanied by nationalistic protection of
the transport services as the new nations sought economic
independence and sources of revenue to meet the expenses of
social reforms. Accompanied by the distancing of Black and
White ruled nations there was a falling off of
intra-organizational relations in the 1960 's as indicated by
border closures and a lack of technical conferences as
compared to the pre- independence period.
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Outward movement, personal interest and diplomacy on the
part of individuals such as Loubser and then the era of
detente ushered in a closer association of transport
organizations. The political reasons and undertones of this
process have been described previously, thus this section
will identify characteristics of a transport association in
Southern Africa and what it may mean for the region's
future
.
The concept 'association' refers to a general
psychological principle and relates to the process by which
individuals or groups become linked to one another and the
resultant groupings. "The concept association sometimes
merely implies the casual juxtaposition of units, but some
degree of organization, however rudimentary or transient
seems imperative ... the purpose of an association undergoes
change... but it must be remembered ... that the units may join
a particular association for quite different and even
conflicting motives." [Ref. 30: p. 40]
Membership in a transport association is open to all
transport organizations in the region due to their common
interests and the interchangeability of equipment (ie.
rolling stock from any country can be found on virtually any
other country's rail line. Peripheral countries
(eg. Tanzania) can afford to occasionally exclude themselves
due to their lack of direct lines to South Africa, all
others cannot afford to do so and thus politics is no longer
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a consideration for membership. Due to its preponderance of
equipment, facilities and services South Africa is able to
be a more important member of this association. However, due
to its diplomatic isolation maintenance of these lines of
communications is important for South Africa and may temper
any domination that it may seek.
The rationale for membership in such an association is
the transportation organization's self interest in the
generation of revenue. This objective is supported by each
government due to the key position trade holds in their
economies, and the parastatal nature of virtually every
railway in the region. Political considerations (ie.
anti-apartheid stance) has formed the basis of membership in
the SADCC by Southern African nations other than South
Africa. However, even in SADCC economic considerations are
paramount given that the aim is to reduce dependence on
South Africa's transport and a change of politics in South
Africa will not alter this primary goal. "This
objective,..., includes reducing dependence on overseas
countries as well as avoiding the trap of excessive
dependence on individual countries, such as Zimbabwe, which
has a relatively sophisticated economy." [Ref. 55]
To fully fit the definition of an association the
grouping requires some degree of organization however
rudimentary or transitory. What form does this organization
take in Southern Africa?
138
The most highly organized grouping of regional transport
is found in the SADCC's Southern African Transport and
Communications Commission (SATCC). Though this is
formalized, it fails to include and seeks to ignore the
dominant transport system, SATS. A more complete but less
organized grouping is the informal association between
transport organizations of all the countries to include the
Republic of South Africa. These are linked to one another
via business and trade agreements that define, regulate and
set charges for the use of each others assets. These
agreements have existed for over 80 years and have
periodically been updated to conform to changing
circumstances or interests of the parties. Some have even
been formalized via international treaty or convention such
as the South Africa-Mozambique convention. An association
also exists by virtue of the technical conferences which
have been held at regular intervals throughout the 1940 ' s
,
50 's and since the mid-1970's. When one considers the lack
of formal relations and the outspoken anti-South Africa
rhetoric of so many of the participating nations these
conferences are the scene of a remarkably free flow of
information and offers of assistance all with at least the
aim of efficient and unobstructed flow of commerce.
One interpretation of South Africa's Constellation of
States is that it is an attempt to seek regional solutions
to regional problems [Ref. 30: p. 53]. This is also a
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useful interpretation of the idea of a transport association
in Southern Africa. A major theme of Loubser's public and
private statements on transport diplomacy and development in
Southern Africa is that South Africa has the means,
expertise and willingness to aid its neighbors in the
resolution of their (collective) problems. This does not
mean to imply that South Africa has all the answers for
regional transportation, but only that it has a great deal
of resources and the professed willingness to work
cooperatively with its neighboring transport organizations.
Public examples of this are most readily viewed in the
transcripts of the technical conferences. Though not in the
public domain the inter-organizational business agreements
also clearly display this cooperative interchange.
By means of this cooperation, SATS is able, through the
association of transport organizations, to complement the
government's objectives of a constellation of states-peace,
stability, order, development and prosperity. Work among
transport organizations also creates common interests and
these may act as a moderating influence on the national
leaders
.
Geldenhuys and Venter examine the viability of the
constellation of states using the four variables of
cohesion, communication, level of power and structure of
relations. They find that economic cohesion, as opposed to
social, political and organizational, is the sole positive
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cohesive force in the region and that the others militate
against it. For similar reasons they found that regional
relations are stuck at the level of limited cooperation in
non-political fields and South Africa's overwhelming power
is an inhibitor to closer relations. Communication is the
only variable in which there is a modicum of normality in
the region, and transport is the major means of
communication in Southern Africa. The other means (tourism,
labour, mass media) are indirect, along racial lines or
one-way and therefore ineffective. Transportation on the
other hand transcends these difficulties and despite efforts
to lessen contacts with South Africa, remains as the only
open and continuous channel of communications. It is
maintained that way due to the common interest of the
parties involved.
The future of any transportation association in Southern
Africa rests on this idea of common interests regardless of
the politics of the member states. This is unlike political
groupings that are so dependent on South Africa's domestic
social and political structures for much of their raison
d'etre. All transportation organizations in Southern Africa
will remain in an associational grouping until the SADCC
countries are able to free themselves of dependence on SATS.
This will not happen in the foreseeable future due to the
structural inefficiencies that exist in the region and the
lack of port facilities for the landlocked countries.
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Active destabilization of neighboring states is not
necessary for South Africa to maintain traffic on its rail
lines. Only with internal stability will Mozambique's and
Angola's railways begin to reach their potential capacities.
And all rail systems of Southern Africa require constant and
diligent maintenance. The unaided expertise for this is at
least ten years away, the interim period will be filled by
SATS personnel or under their supervision. Ultimately,
dissolution of a transport association will lay in the
capability of non-South African ports for only through them
can reliance on South Africa's rail and road network be
avoided for the conduct of external trade. Even at the
stage when transport networks operate at capacity and ports
are able to handle their required loads, intra-regional
trade shall be such (as it is now) that total and complete
severance from South Africa will not likely take place.
Consequently, transportation is now and shall be for the
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
In Southern Africa it has proven impossible to separate
economic and technological considerations from political
considerations. Despite leading actors' declarations about
the non-political nature of transportation, when it is made
an integral part of a government's organization and is
essential to a state's livelihood (particularly for states
that earn a good portion of their Gross National Product via
foreign trade) transport becomes political. This is apparent
to varying degrees depending on the degree of subtlety of
its use. Because of this inherent politicization of
transport, any use of transport as a punishment has a
destabilizing effect.
'Transport diplomacy', the term itself accentuates the
political nature of transportation, is the way in which
South Africa utilized its transport assets and organization
to effect positive political influence with its neighbors.
It can be regarded as the art of enabling the transport
potential of a country to play a maximum role in that
country's relations with other countries, for the
furtherance of its own as well as the common interests.
[Ref. 34: p. 5] This is partially founded on the belief that
stable interstate relations are preferred and mutually
beneficial, and that economic ties (trade, transport,
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communications and assistance) can transcend political
differences and strengthen a positive relationship. The
case studies in this paper do not seem to bear this out
.
However, the opposite, that economic ties lead to
interstate disintegration, is not supported either.
Apparently, the best one can hope for is that there may be
economic benefits for both parties and political benefits if
they want them.
Another facet of relations shown by these cases is that
situations of structural dependence are not entirely
intractable, nor are the constraints imposed by the
interdependence of Southern Africa confined to the
landlocked states. This has been illustrated by Zambia's
ability to, for at least five years, disengage itself from
Rhodesia following the latter's border closure. State's
bordering the seas may find themselves dependent on their
landlocked neighbors, not the other way a round, if a key
revenue earner is transport and it is dependent on transit
traffic for a large share of its revenue.
Consequently, "dominant governments do not enjoy an
unlimited facility to achieve foreign policy objectives."
[Ref. 57: p. 324] Disengagement can probably be affected
relatively quickly in the political and military spheres but
not in the economic sphere. The issue for the longer term is
whether prevailing economic structures will undermine a
drive for political autonomy, or whether political
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initiatives can insert the thin edge of the wedge of
eventual structural change in the economic sphere. The first
task is simply to distinguish the alterable relationships
from those that are more enduring. [Ref. 57: p. 324] All of
this leads one to retreat from the extreme position that
economic dependence constrains policy choice.
Sensitivity interdependence will be less important than
vulnerability interdependence in providing power to
actors. If one actor can reduce its costs by altering
its policies, either domestically or internationally,
the sensitivity patterns will not be a good guide to
power resources. [Ref. 58: p. 15]
This is clearly displayed by the two cases of interaction
between Zambia and Rhodesia in 1966 and 1973. In both cases
Rhodesia enjoyed a favorable asymmetrical sensitivity
interdependence vis-a-vis Zambia. The difference was that
in 1973 Zambia was able, and did, alter her domestic and
international policies, particularly in utilizing
alternative trade routes.
Economic relations and dependence can be severed
immediately but only at great cost. Dependence in the
transport field can be altered, but only if done slowly and
at only relatively less expense. However, once accomplished
it may be longer lasting than political relationships. The
problem to overcome is that structural relationships die
hard, but once broken are severed more permanently.
152
APPENDIX A
DEPENDENCE, INTERDEPENDENCE AND VULNERABILITY
Prior to examining case studies involving the use of
transportation as an element of foreign policy, it is
necessary to examine briefly the ideas of dependence or
reliance and interdependence of states on their neighbors in
the field of transport, especially rail lines and ports.
Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph Nye in their book Power and
Interdependence address the issue of dependence defining it
as "a state of being determined or significantly affected by
external forces" [Ref. 58: p. 8] and identify two key
dimensions, sensitivity and vulnerability. Interdependence
is defined as mutual dependence and differs from simple
relations, or ' interconnectedness
'
, in that the interactions
involved have reciprocal (although not necessarily
symmetrical) costly effects. Such interdependence will
always involve costs since, by definition, it restricts the
actors' autonomy. [Ref. 58: pp. 12-13]
Sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed
from outside before policies are altered to try to change
the situation.
Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a
policy framework - how quickly do changes in one country
bring costly changes in another, and how great are the
costly effects? It is measured not merely by the volume
of flows across borders but also by the costly effects
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of changes in transactions on the societies or
governments. [Ref. 58: p. 12]
Vulnerability, on the other hand, refers to a nation's
liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even
after policies have been altered. "Vulnerability dependence
can be measured only by the costliness of making effective
adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time."
[Ref. 58: p. 13]
Here, the primary issue is the way in which
interdependence, vulnerability or sensitivity affect
inter-state relationships. Keohane and Nye state that
"asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power" when
one thinks of "power as control over resources, or the
potential to affect outcomes." [Ref. 58: p. 11] However,
this advantage does not guarantee control over the outcome
of its use as a political tool.
Vulnerability is particularly important for
understanding the political structure of interdependence
relationships ... .Vulnerability is clearly more relevant
than sensitivity, for example, in analyzing the politics
of raw materials ... a high percentage of imports of
material is taken as an index of vulnerability, when by
itself it merely suggests that sensitivity is high."
[Ref. 58: p. 15]
This is precisely what will be seen to have happened in some
of the following case studies in which an attempt to
manipulate asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence without
regard for underlying patterns of vulnerability were
undertaken.
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Keohane and Nye also caution that "a measure of
potential power such as asymmetrical interdependence" is not
able to infallibly predict actors' successes or failures at
influencing outcomes. It merely provides a first
approximation of initial bargaining advantages available to
either side." [Ref. 58: p. 19] This is of particular
concern in Southern Africa where a common belief holds that
there has been/is a high level of vulnerability on the part
of Southern African states on the transport network of South
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